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Abstract 
In recent years computer viruses have become increasingly significant as a form of 
computer abuse. By virtue of their reproductive capability, computer viruses can 
have cumulative and potentially catastrophic effects to the many people who use 
those affected computers. There is a growing concern in the computing community 
about these forms of electronic vandalism. This concern arises from the possible 
damage to stored information on which the work depends and the ensuing 
disruption of the work-place. 
Although the vandalism or purposeful abuse by introducing computer 
viruses to computer systems was originally mainly an American experience, 
research reports published by the Australian Computer Abuse Research Bureau 
(ACARB) support the claim that computer viruses have become increasingly 
significant as a form of computer abuse in Australia in recent years. Apart from 
ACARB's figures, there is minimal empirical research of a similar nature being 
conducted to investigate computer viruses as a form of computer abuse in 
Australia. In this study, an attempt has been made to investigate the problem, albeit 
on a limited scope. 
In this study, the infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in limited 
government IT organizations in Western Australia were investigated. In addition, 
this study has made an attempt to validate Spafford's speculation that less than 10 
viruses (out of a minimum of 374) account for 90%, of infections in the Western 
Australian environment. 
This study was descriptive in nature in that a fact-finding survey based on 
questionnaires and standardized interviews was conducted in State Government IT 
organizations in Western Australia in order to obtain data on which the research 
V 
findings can be based. The data gathering instrument for this study was a 
standardized questionnaire which comprised limited choice questions directed at 
obtaining such information as infection rates of various types of computer viruses. 
The questionnaire was field tested to eliminate ambiguous or biased items and to 
improve format, both for ease of understanding and facility in analyzing results. 
The questionnaire was used by the interviewer as a basis for the interview so that 
the potential for subjectivity and bias can be reduced. 
Before the commencement of this study, a letter of transmittal was sent to 
the prospective participants in order to request their participations. Confirmation of 
participation was sought through telephone calls. A very high response rate 
(87.5%, n = 42) for this study was achieved. This is taken as an assurance that 
reasonable representation of the state government sector for the study is achieved. 
Prior to commencement of this study, approval was sought from the 
University Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research since this study will 
involve human subjects. During the interview, subjects were informed of the 
purpose of the study, that there will be no compulsion to participate in the study 
and that they will be free to withdraw from further participation in the study at any 
time they desire. 
The results of the survey and its implications are provided in chapters 5 and 
6. In conclusion, the research ratifies the proposition that currently very few of the 
IBM PC viruses contribute to the vast majority of infections in the W estem 
Australian work-place. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
1.1.1 Computer viruses as a form of computer crime1 
Computers potentially offer a tremendous advantage in providing accurate and 
timely information for making decisions, but their accessibility and proliferation can 
1 This paper commences with the proposition that deliberate development of a computer 
virus for computer abuse with malicious intent is a form of computer crime. Although 
this position is dependent upon the laws of the country in which the action talces place, it 
is reasonable to talce the majority position which would describe the action as criminal 
since the activity is not contained within country boundaries. 
It should be noted that there are subtle differences between the terms "computer 
crime", "computer fraud" and "computer abuse". For example, unlike fraud the release of 
a computer virus is unlikely to cause financial gain to the culprit. Indeed, there have 
been examples of computer viruses being released without deliberate intent to perform 
damage, as pointed out by Leiss (1990, p. 37). Nevertheless, the final outcome on the 
victim is still the same. 
Notwithstanding, it is beyond the scope of this paper to made an attempt to 
differentiate the exact delineation between these terms. Thus, in the remaining of this 
paper, these terms will be used interchangeably. 
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pose major security problems. Since the first documented computer crime case in 
1958 (Parker, 1976, p. 34), the fraudulent misuse of computers, according to 
Palmer & Potter (1989, p. 14), is now a major criminal activity.2 Not only has 
computer fraud increased in frequency, it has increased in sophistication as well. 
Today, the computing community is dealing with what the New York Times vividly 
2 For example, a "Commitment to Security" survey of 3,500 computer security 
professionals conducted by the National Centre for Computer Crime Data (NCCCD) in 
the United States in 1989 revealed that the annual cost incurred as a result of computer 
abuse in the U.S. is estimated at $5.5 billion, 930 person years, and 15.3 computer years 
("News track", 1989, p. 657; Bloombecker, 1989; Baker, 1991, p. 4). The average 
annual known computer abuse losses from the assessable cases are $109,000, 365 person 
hours, and 26 computer hours. NCCCD data has previously noted that 45% of reported 
cases of computer crime in the U.S. are computer-related fraud (Bloombecker, 1988). 
Statistics from the Financial Crimes Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) suggest, however, a higher average cost per incident of $430,000, with annual 
losses in the U.S. estimated at $100 billion (Kamay & Adam, 1990, p. 10). As for 
Australia, data gathered from the Australian Computer Abuse Research Bureau 
(ACARB) indicate that from 1978 to May 1990, the average annual known computer 
abuse losses from 151 assessable cases in Australia is $100,749 (Kamay et al., 1990), as 
shown in Table 2. 
A survey carried out by BIS Applied Systems Limited, a computer consultancy 
firm in the United Kingdom, indicated that the average amount defrauded per incident 
in the U.K. has increased from £31,000 in 1983 to £262,000 in 1986 and then to 
£483,000 in 1989 (Wong & Watt, 1990, p. 35). This represents a 15-fold increase in 
value over the three periods. The maximum loss recorded has also gone up from 
£500,000 to £10 million and then £27 million over the three periods. 
2 
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calls "the letter bomb of the computer age: computer viruses"3 ("Letter bomb", 
1988). With the advent of electronic mail, computer viruses have become more 
than the letter bomb of the computer age, as bemoaned by Zajac (1988, p. 3), "they 
have become a global threat." 
It seems evident (Fites, Johnston, & Kratz, 1992, p. 11; Kamay et al., 1990, 
, p. 17; Denning, 1990, p. xiv; Leiss, 1990, p. 4) that the real reason why computer 
viruses are becoming a serious problem, and could be catastrophic in the future, is 
linked to one of the long-term trends in the development of computers: 
connectivity. 4 
The following well-publicized incident (Denning, 1989; Rochlis & Eichin, 
1989; Spafford, 1989; Markoff, 1988; Eisenberg, Gries, Hartmanis, Holcomb, 
3 A computer virus is generally defined as a set of instructions, usually attached to the 
beginning or end of a program file, that propagate themselves through computer systems 
and/or networks, deliberately set to do things unwanted by the legitimate owners of those 
systems. (See section 1.1. 3 for a definition of a computer virus.) 
4 The advent of networking, especially local area networks (LANs), in the second half of 
the 1980s had far reaching consequences. The systems software (e.g., file systems, 
operating systems) of PCs was basically designed with a single user in mind. As soon as 
PCs were connected to each other (and to minicomputer or mainframe, or both), this 
single-user world view was shattered; yet the operating systems of many personal work 
stations did not change drastically. On the one hand, networking was added to enhance 
the functionality of the older systems, on the other hand, even newer systems sometimes 
ran older systems software, usually for reasons of compatibility. "As a result," Leiss 
(1990, p. 7) argues, "safeguard against (accidental or malicious) undesired changes of 
data and software ... are substantially inadequate." Leiss (1990, p. 9) goes on to add that 
"many problems stemming from virus attacks can ultimately be traced back to this 
change in the computing milieu." 
3 
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Lynn, & Santoro, 1989; Montz, 1990a; Gardner, 1989; Ferbrache, 1990) is edited 
from the above sources to illustrate the extent to which connectivity has 
exacerbated the computer viruses problem. 
On November 2, 1988, a graduate student at Cornell University released a 
"worm" program5 into ARP ANET (Denning, 1989/1990; Quarterman & Hoskins, 
1986/1990, p. 42), a North American academic networking system that includes 
electronic mail capabilities. Within hours, it had spread to several thousand 
computers attached to the ARPA Internet.6 Over an eight-hour period the worm 
invaded between 2,500 and 3,000 Digital Equipment Corporation's VAX 
computers and Sun Microsystems' Sun 3 systems running the Berkeley and AT&T 
UNIX operating system version 4.3 at such major Internet sites as Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of California at Berkeley, three 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) facilities, and Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory.7 The scope of the break-ins came as a great 
5 The program may not be a virus by the definition used in this paper, but rather a form of 
worm. The difference is academic: the program did not attach itself to any other program 
while spreading, it only sent copies of itself through a mail system, and is thus not a 
computer virus in the strictest sense. See the next section for the discussion of a worm. 
6 The ARPA Internet (Quarterman & Hoskins, 1986/1990, p. 40) is an internetwork of 
several networks, of which ARP ANET is the oldest. Internet exists to facilitate sharing 
of resources at participating organizations and free exchange of research findings among 
researchers through electronic mail and other services, as well as to provide a testbed for 
new developments in networking. 
7 This machine base was a small subset of the hosts connected to the Internet. Ferbrache 
(1990, p. 14) argues that the diversity of Internet host platforms was a significant factor 
in reducing the spread of the worm. Had Morris extended his attacks to the common Sun 
4 
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surprise to almost everyone, despite the fact that UNIX has long been known to 
have some security weaknesses, as discussed in Grampp & Morris (1984) and Reid 
(1987). 
Computers infested with the worm were soon labouring under a huge load 
of programs that looked like innocuous "shell" programs (command interpreters.) 
The worm program expropriated the resources of each invaded computer by 
replicating rampantly and clogging them with many copies of itself, but did no 
apparent damage. Attempts to kill these programs were ineffective: new copies 
would appear from Internet connections as fast as old copies were deleted. Many 
of the computers had to be disconnected from the network until all copies of this 
prolific worm program could be eradicated and the security loopholes the worm 
used to gain entry could be plugged. The worm program had done no permanent 
damage to stored files or programs, but its disruptive spread had cost hundreds of 
hours of human effort and computer time. 8 
386i and Sun 4 systems, Ferbrache (1990, p. 14) maintains, the impact of the worm 
would have been far greater. 
The immediacy of communication, the ability to copy source and binary files 
from machine to machine, and the widespread availability of both source and expertise 
allowed personnel throughout the U.S. to work together to solve the infection despite the 
widespread disconnection of parts of the network are some other factors perceived by 
Spafford (1989) that have helped to defeat the worm. 
8 Estimated losses from individual sites are generally not available. However, NASA's 
Ames Research Centre and the U.S. Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory estimated their dollar losses at $72,500 and $100,000, respectively 
(Montz, 1990b, p. 457). These losses were attributed primarily to lost staff time. Report 
from the NCCCD (cited in Adams, 1989, p. 10) points out that the cost of cleaning out 
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This incident gained much publicity9 and reactions10 in the computing 
community perhaps because it highlights the subtlety and danger of attacks by 
systems in just one user organization, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, was 
estimated at US $250,000. 
9 The worm's fast and massive infestation was so portentous that the New York Times, the 
Wall Street Journal and USA Today gave it front-page coverage. It was the subject of 
two articles in Science magazine (Marshall, 1988a, 1988b). These accounts said that 
over 6,000 computers were infested, but later estimates (Denning, 1989, p. 126) put the 
actual number between 2,500 and 3,000, about 5% of those attached to the Internet. 
10 Shortly after the Internet incident, several major groups issued public statements 
decrying the incident, .calling for more responsibility by network users and citing as 
unethical any disruption of the intended use of networks, wasting of resources through 
disruption, destruction of computer-based information, compromising of privacy (Farber, 
1989; Cerf, l 989). These groups include the board of directors of the CSNET and 
BITNET networks, the advisory panel for the division of networking and research 
infrastructure at the National Science Foundation, and the Internet Activities Board. The 
president of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) at the time of the Internet 
incident called on the computing community to make network hygiene a standard 
practice (Kocher, 1989, p. 6). 
In the aftermath of the Internet incident the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) 
established the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the Software 
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. The CERT was 
established to assemble a network of experts to monitor attacks on computers, coordinate 
responses, and issue advisories. The CERT deals with attacks of all kinds, including 
intruders, worms, and viruses (Scherlis, Squires, & Pethia, 1990, p. 498). Similar 
organizations have been established by the U.S. Department of Energy (Computer 
Incident Advisory Capability), the U.S. Defence Data Network (security co-ordination 
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computer viruses and worms on computers attached to open networks11 : the 
potential for loss of valuable information was enormous, and an actual loss may 
have been devastating to the many people who used those computers. The 
occurrence of this incident has prompted Fites et al. (1992) to assert: 
It is no longer true that computers are reasonably safe from each 
other. . . . Connectivity means that . . . we're all susceptible to 
attack. (p. 26) 
The attacks on computers not attached to networks by viruses could prove to have 
equally disastrous consequences because viruses restricted to personal computers 
(PCs) have also infected computers on a global scale. The Brain virus, for 
example, is reported (e.g., Hafuer, 1988, p. 53; Grocott, Palmer, & Travis, 1990) 
to have infected an untold number of PCs as it travelled throughout the world. 
Computer viruses (and related threats) are thus a form of computer crime 
that is arguably more insidious than any other because of the sheer number of 
computers and people that could be affected, the anonymity of the perpetration, 
and the often apparent absence of reason on the part of the perpetrator. By virtue 
of their reproductive capability, computer viruses can have cumulative and 
potentially catastrophic effects to the many people who used those affected 
computers. 
centre) and by NASA (SPAN network centre), according to Ferbrache (1990, p. 17). 
Each co-operates closely in exchanging information on known security problems. 
11 Denning (1989, p. 128) maintains that since the Internet is designed for openness, it is 
impossible to draw conclusions about closed networks from this incident. 
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1.1.2 Computer viruses and related threats 
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that several other terms are often 
used in discussions about computer viruses. The terms include: Worm, bacteria 
(rabbits), Trojan horse, logic bomb, and trapdoor (backdoor). These are terms that 
are often used interchangeably with computer virus by the layman. 12 To the general 
reader the difference between these types of computer virus may be slight but to 
the technician they are significant and reflect a position on definition. Thus it is 
worth giving brief explanation of these terms. 13 
A worml4 is a software program that can run on its own, in contrast to a 
virus. The worm is generally designed to search for idle computer memory; it then 
12 For example, in the Internet incident, some of the media reports (e.g, Markoff, 1988; 
Jackson, 1988; Alexander, 1988) have mistakenly called the invading program a virus 
rather than a worm. Denning (1989, p. 127) argues that the mistaken use of terminology 
in this incident has "exaggerated the seriousness of what had happened" because the 
worm is a less insidious attack (when compared to a virus), given that "the security 
weaknesses in the Internet service programs have been repaired" shortly after the attack 
and that "it is unlikely that an attack against these specific weaknesses could be launched 
again." 
13 The reader is referred to the papers written by Murray (1988), and Rochlis et al. (1989) 
which contain extensive discussions about terminology, the differentiation between 
terms, and the appropriateness of calling a computer virus a virus. 
14 Some observers (Denning, 1990, p. 192; Shoch & Hupp, 1982, p. 172) suggest 
that the concept that a worm that would "invade other computers and perform acts 
directed by its owner" originated in John Brunner's (1975) science fiction novel, The 
Shockwave Riders, in 1975. In the computing community, the first worm programs were 
implemented in the network of Alto workstations at the Xerox Palo Alto Research 
Centre in the early 1980s (Shoch et al., 1982). Their authors, John Shoch and Jon Hupp, 
8 
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rewrites itself successively through the computer's memory until the computer is 
exhausted and the system crashes. The worm also differs from the computer virus 
in that it does not insert itself into other programs. It travels over network 
connections to establish itself on other machines. 
The Bacteria, or rabbits, are worms which cannot use networks to travel. 
They do not alter existing code but reproduce until resources are exhausted. If a 
system becomes clogged with a bacterium it should be closed down and restarted 
from known 'clean' program sets. The most common form of this problem is 
actually a bug which causes some program to self-propagate without limit. 
A Trojan horse, like a virus, is a section of code embedded within a 
legitimate application that performs operations unknown to and unwanted by the 
user. It is a special case of a virus and possesses the same properties, except the 
ability to replicate itself The unauthorized code may or may not direct the 
legitimate program to cause damage to the system. The Trojan horse may be 
activated immediately or may continue to operate as legitimate software for an 
extended period oftime before activating itself (see logic bomb). 
A logic bomb or a time bomb is a set of instructions that are executed in 
conjunction with a predetermined event. The "trigger" is often a specific date or 
time (e.g., April Fool's Day, Friday the 13th). The logic bomb has a legitimate use 
in demonstration copies of software and as a form of copy protection. A virus or 
Trojan horse may also contain a logic bomb. 
The trapdoor, also known as the backdoor, is a section of code inserted 
into a program which allows some particular security mechanism to be avoided, 
intended them to replicate and locate idle workstations for temporary use as computer 
servers; Shoch et al. saw that the worms could easily go out of control and disable the 
workstations and the network. Their hopes for benign uses of worm programs were not 
realised in the years following, as demonstrated in the Internet incident. 
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thus allowing unauthorized or unmonitored access. It has a legitimate use in the 
debugging of software. A virus or Trojan horse may implant a trapdoor in the 
system. 
1.1.3 A matter of definition 
To define a computer virus in such simple terms as "a parasitic form of computer 
code which has the particular characteristic of being able to reproduce itself'' ( al-
Dossary, 1990, p. 131) is oversimplifying its attributes and "is not acceptable to the 
computer community," in the words of Highland (1990, p. 1). To avoid this danger 
this paper uses the following definitions. The reason for the inclusion of these 
definitions is not to be comprehensive, but to emphasize that there is not one 
definition of the term currently agreed upon. 
A "computer virus" is a program that can "infect" other programs 
by modifying them to include a possibly evolved version of itself 
With this infection property, a virus can spread to the transitive 
closure of information flow, corrupting the integrity of information 
as it spreads . . . . Viruses can act as carriers of [ any code the 
attacker wishes to use] and thus can be used to cause arbitrary 
[changes in programs and data.] They can carry other attacks along 
with them, and thus by-pass many of the mechanisms that would 
otherwise protect against these other attacks. (Cohen, 1984, 
l 988)15 
Virus: (1) A variation of Trojan horse. It is propagating (attaching 
itself to files, programs) with a triggering mechanism ( event, time) 
15 Dr. Frederick B. Cohen, whose research in computer viruses was first published in 1984, 
prepared this definition for the April 1988 issue of Computers & Security. 
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with a mission (delete files, send data) .... (2) A section of code 
introduced into a disk operating system for malicious purposes. At 
some stage the inserted code will trigger a process that will 
eliminate all files from the disk. The effects of the virus can extend 
to many users. A disk containing the virus is loaded into a 
computer, and it resides in cor:nputer memory. The virus detects 
when a new disk is loaded into the system and then writes itself 
onto that disk. (Longley & Shain, 1989, p. 360) 
[ A computer virus is] program code, usually attached to the 
beginning or end of a program file, which contains the following: 
(1) A part which is responsible for self-replication, i.e., which 
causes propagation of the virus by copying the entire virus 
code (or a modified version thereof) to other program files 
(or to some other region of a disk) at certain opportunities 
(usually upon execution of the already-infected program or 
execution of the to-be-infected program). 
(2) A part which performs some action ( often a destructive 
action on files or on entire disks) when a certain event takes 
place (e.g., upon execution of an infected program on a 
certain date or after the virus has replicated itself a certain 
number of times). (Radai, 1989, p. 111)16 
A true [computer] virus is a set of instructions, programmatic or 
otherwise, that propagate themselves through computer systems 
and/or networks, deliberately set to do things unwanted by the 
16 Yisrael Radai prepared this definition for the April 1989 issue of Computers & Security. 
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legitimate owners of those systems. Key to this definition is that 
introduction of a virus as a deliberate act, not a technical 
~alfunction, implying an actively hostile human intelligence behind 
the virus. The harm viruses [ could cause] may be no more than 
denying use of a computer to its owners, or the complete and 
irretrievable loss of data and software. The potential for damage 
cannot be quantified, but it is unlimited in scope. (Ross, 1989) 
The ability to replicate itself, the infection of other programs, the attachment to 
another program, the idea of a carrier and the notion of performing an unexpected 
function are the common functions included in these definitions. 
The debate about the definition of a computer virus will probably continue. 
It would be difficult to express the nature of this problem more eloquently than in 
the words of Leiss (1990): 
It should be kept in mind . . . that this area of computer security is 
still quite young; consequently there continue to be disagreements 
among researchers about the precise delineation between certain 
terms. (p. 29) 
Dr. Harold Joseph Highland (1990, p. 27), founding editor and editor-in-chief of 
the international professional journal, Computers & Security, adds further weight 
to this argument by stating that currently it does not appear likely that computer 
scientists will agree upon an "official" definition of the term. 
1.1.4 History of computer viruses 
There are some who claim that the idea of a computer virus was born in the earliest 
days of the computer era. Elmer-DeWitt (1988, p. 65), for example, argues that it 
was computer pioneer John von Neumann who laid out the basic blueprint of an 
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electronic virus in a 1949 paper titled "Theory and organization of complicated 
automata." There are others (e.g., Zajac, 1990, p. 25; Fitzgerald, 1989, p. 43; 
Simons, 1989, p. 114) who consider computer viruses as the offspring of Frederick 
B. Cohen. 17 Still other people ( e.g., Adams, 1989, p. 3) maintain that computer 
viruses have their origin in the "hacker" cultures of such premier American 
technological universities as MIT, Carnegie-Mellon and California Institute of 
Technology. 18 
17 For his doctoral dissertation for the University of Southern California, Cohen (1986) 
created a virus in an effort to find a way to defend against self-replicating programs. 
Cohen (1984) first made his research public at the 1984 National Computer Security 
Conference. He made his :findings known to an international audience during his 
presentation that same year at the International Federation for Information Processing 
Computer Security Conference (IFIP/Sec'84) in Toronto, Canada in September 1984. It 
was established that a computer virus could infect some systems in a few minutes. A 
massive new computer security issue was soon apparent. 
18 In his Turing Award Lecture, Thompson (1984) discusses how computer science 
students would amused themselves by inventing games that could reproduce an exact 
copy of itself. One of these was a series of games called Core Wars (Dewdney, 1985; 
1987; 1989) that involved programs that went to war against one another - the winner 
being determined by the program that grew and outliving the others. What Thompson is 
describing is a virus, a program that can effectively reproduce itself to include possibly 
some evolved version of the original. To the dismay of his colleagues, Thompson (1984, 
p. 761) not only revealed the existence of the computer viruses in the lecture, but went 
on to show the audience how to make them: "If you have never done this, I urge you to 
try it on your own." Elmer-DeWitt (1988, p. 64) maintains that the revelation was 
further compounded by Dewney's landmark article in the May 1984 issue of Scientific 
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Nevertheless, it appears (Spafford, Heaphy, & Ferbrache, 1989/1990, p. 
318) that computer viruses were being written. by other individuals, although not 
named as such, as early as 1981 on early Apple II PCs. Some early Apple II viruses 
included the notorious Festering Hate, Cyberaids, and Elk Cloner strains. 
Spafford et al. (1989/1990, p. 318) maintain that the Elk Cloner virus was first 
reported in mid-1981. 
1.1.5 The (In)famous "Trio" 
It was not until the fall of 1987 that computer viruses began to command world-
wide attention in the popular press as well as in the trade and technical press. Late 
in 1987 computer viruses struck at two universities in the U.S. and one in Israel. 
The Brain virus first appeared on the campus of the University of 
Delaware in October 1987 (Webster, 1989). A few weeks later, the Lehigh virus 
American, which described Core Ware and offered readers who sent U.S. $2 for postage 
a copy for guide-lines for creating their own viral battlefields. 
In March 1985, Scientific American published a letter in its Computer 
Recreations section from two programmers that established a blueprint of a PC based 
computer virus. According to Dewdney ( 1985), Roberto Cerruti and Mario Morocutti of 
Brescia in Italy were inspired by the description of core wars: 
Mario thought to write a program capable of passing from one 
computer to the other like a virus, and 'infecting' in this way, other 
Apples. But we were not able to conceive it until I realised that the 
program had to infect floppy disks .... We decided that after 16 self 
reproducing cycles, the program should decide to re-initialize the disk 
immediately on bootstrap. Now, the awful evil of our idea was clear, 
and we decided never to carry it out, nor to speak to anybody about the 
idea. (p. 16) 
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was discovered at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania (van Wyk, 1989). In 
December, the Hebrew University at Jerusalem found itself attacked by a computer 
virus (Radai, 1989). In order to discover how the virus works and precisely what it 
does, a group of students in the Computer Science Department of the Hebrew 
University disassembled the virus code and began to study it and found the 
Jerusalem or Friday the 13th virus. 19 
Since the outbreak of these three incidents, the media have run numerous 
stories about break-ins, worms, and viruses and been somewhat sensationalised as 
a consequence. 20 The number of incidents has been on the rise ever since. There is 
a growing concern in the computer community about these forms of electronic 
19 These three viruses can be broadly categorised into two different types. The Brain virus 
was a boot sector infector. The Lehigh virus and the Jerusalem viruses were executable 
program infectors. The former attached itself only to COMMAND.COM; the other two 
viruses infected .EXE and/or .COM programs. 
The three viruses also differed in the way the media is attacked. Aside from the 
Lehigh virus that infected both floppy disks and hard disks, the others only infected 
floppy disks. The Brain sometimes destroyed several sectors of a disk but often did little 
more damage. The Lehigh virus, depending upon its host, would wipe out an entire disk 
after a set number of DOS operations. 
The Jerusalem viruses were replicators, causing an increase in the size of 
program. Although most viruses will not reinfect a previously infected program, the 
coding of one of the Jerusalem viruses was defected. It permitted the reinfection of an 
infected program. Because of the viral infection some programs were unable to be 
executed since there was insufficient memory. In other cases there was a substantial 
increase in program execution time. 
20 For example, it was argued (Highland, 1988; Simons, 1989, p. 115) that in a rush to get 
stories into print some misinformation, unfortunately, were included. 
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vandalism. This concern arises from the possible damage to stored information on 
which the work depends and the ensuing disruption of the work-place. The danger 
of attacks by computer viruses on computers, however, is not confined to 
destruction or modification of data only, as shown in section 1.1.6. 
1. 1. 6 Risks posed by viruses 
The range of threats posed by viruses is limited only by the imagination and lack of 
ethics of their creators. According to The Computer Virus Handbook (n. d.), a 
guide written by Price Waterhouse professionals in the U.S. and U.K., some of the 
risks posed by viruses include the following: 
Loss of Life. In a real-time system ( e.g., airline traffic control system) the 
attack of a computer virus can be life threatening. In the case of the 
penetration of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Computer, the intruder 
entered a computer used in real-time control of a medical experiment (Stoll, 
1988). Had he not been detected in time, a patient might have been severely 
injured or even killed. 
Destruction or Modification of Data. In the first conviction for a virus 
crime, a disgruntled employee at a Texas-based securities trading and 
insurance firm planted a program that systematically deleted sales 
commission records every month (Wong & Watt, 1990, p. 63; Wilding, 
1990a, p. 4; Hafner, 1988, p. 50; Elmer-DeWitt, 1988, p. 63). In this 
manner the logic bomb erased 168,000 client records. The company was 
fortunate in that the crime was detected after only two days. Still, the 
company had to spend considerable time, effort, and money rebuilding its 
damaged database. 
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Interruption of Operations. The most significant secondary effects of a 
virus are those that involve lost productivity. Computer support personnel 
will be involved with the tasks of recovering or recreating lost files, 
programs, or data; removing the virus; diagnosing the problem; and 
developing preventive measures. Management time may be required to re-
establish the confidence of customers/shareholders and to formulate 
procedures that will reduce the risk of future virus attack. Internal and 
external auditors may have to demonstrate to the audit committee and 
senior management that adequate audit procedures were used during the 
examination. 
Embarrassment. Attacks of computer viruses at universities have been 
well documented (e.g, Grocott et al., 1990; White, 1989; Webster, 1989; 
van Wyk, 1989; Radai, 1989; Monk, 1990). However, the private sector 
has been reluctant to admit vulnerability to virus attacks due largely to their 
fear of adverse publicity. Details of a successful virus attack, including the 
losses suffered, could shake shareholder confidence in an organization's 
management. Many corporations are unwilling to discuss the issue for fear 
that any revelation might attract attention and provoke a future attack. 
1.1. 7 The growth of the virus problem 
The problem of computer viruses has grown to significant proportions in the last 
few years ("News track", 1991, p. 9; Wilding, 1991a, p. 2), as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1, adapted from Fites et al. (1992, p. 53), shows that the number of new 
IBM PC viruses is almost growing at an exponential rate from late 1986 to January 
1991. 
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Data gathered by Virus Bulletin, an authoritative international publication 
on computer virus prevention, recognition and removal, also show a similar trend. 
Virus Bulletin publishes an update of known IBM PC viruses reported to the 
bulletin during the preceding month in each of its editions. In its first edition in July 
1989, the bulletin listed only 14 virus patterns. Two years later, the bulletin lists a 
total of374 known viruses affecting IBM PC, XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles in its 
July 1991 issue.21 (A listing of these 374 viruses is reproduced in this paper as 
Appendix 1 to give the reader a general feel of the name and types of the 3 7 4 
unique IBM PC viruses.) 
The growth of the virus problem is not restricted to the IBM PC, and now 
affects all popular personal computers including Macintosh, Apple II, Atari ST, 
and Commodore Amiga. Mainframe viruses do exist for a variety of operating 
systems and machines, "but all reported cases to date have been experimental in 
nature, written by serious academic researchers in controlled environments" 
(Spafford et al., 1989/1990, p. 319). 
Most virus activity has involved PCs because of several factors, one of the 
most important being the PC software (e.g. MS-DOS) does not contain user and 
supervisor mode (Kamay et al., 1990, p. 16; Adams, 1989, p. 12). Thus any 
knowledgeable person has access to operating system level commands. In a 
Mainframe operating system, such access would be in privileged mode and 
therefore unavailable to application programs and all except systems programmers. 
21 However, it should be noted that there are conflicting reports on the number of known 
viruses as of 1991 by various researchers. The number of virus samples gathered by 
Virus Bulletin is chosen for its authoritativeness. The second paragraph of section 1.4 
gives a brief discussion of the reason for the disparity in the number of viruses being 
reported. 
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1. 1. 8 Viruses in the Australian scene 
Although the vandalism or purposeful abuse by introducing computer viruses or 
worms to computer systems so far seems to be mainly an American experience, it 
has become increasingly significant as a form of computer abuse in Australia in 
recent years, as shown in Tables 1 & 2 on pages 31 and 32, respectively. In fact, 
Tables 1 & 2 show that computer virus represents the fastest growing category of 
abuse in terms of the frequency of occurrence during the period from February 
1989 to May 1990 in Australia. 
Tables 1 & 2, adapted from Kamay et al. (1989, 1990), have been updated 
from computer abuse cases notified to and documented by the Australian 
Computer Abuse Research Bureau (ACARB) during the period from February 
1989 to May 1990. The ACARB's figures indicate that total number of computer 
virus cases increased from 12 in the period ending January 1989 to 45 in the period 
ending May 1990. From the 45 computer virus cases reported since 1989, the 
average loss to the victims is $9,310 per crime.22 The figures indicate that 
computer viruses, as a type of computer abuse, represents 59% of the reported 
case over the period from February 1989 to May 1990. 
Although ACARB's figures do not necessarily show the complete extent of 
computer abuse in Australia, it is important to note that the factual evidence that 
exists in the profile supports the claim that computer virus, as a type of computer 
abuse in Australia, is showing a gradual significance over this period of time. 
Apart from ACARB's figures, there is minimal empirical research of a 
similar nature being conducted to investigate computer viruses as a form of 
computer abuse in Australia. This study was thus appropriate in that it provides 
current evidence as to whether there is a problem in the work environment as 
22 It should be noted that this average loss is based on a small sample of 2. The real figure 
is likely to be much higher. 
20 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
opposed to the creation and isolation of computer viruses m laboratories of 
computer science. 
1.1.9 The present study 
In the present study the extent to which the Western Australian environment is 
being infected by IBM PC computer viruses was examined. In particular, the study 
investigated the infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in selected 
government organizations in Western Australia. 
Although the present study was designed to investigate the government 
sector, it was designed to be sufficiently generalizable for use to investigate other 
sectors as well (e.g., small business sector, large business sector). Some future 
comparison study with other states and sectors would be a fruitful area for further 
research. (See section 7 .2.1.) 
The main reason why the present study focused on IBM PC computer 
viruses (and not other PC or Mainframe viruses) is because the vast majority of 
virus attacks reported to date have been against personal computers, with the 
attacks on IBM PCs dominating. 23 In tum this is probably because the IBM style 
PC is the most prolific PC throughout the world. 
In addition, the present study aimed to test Spafford's (1990) speculation24 
that "less than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections." Since this study adopted 
23 Baker (1991, p. 31) argues that more than 70% of all reported infections have involved 
IBM PCs and compatibles although he gives no information on how the data are 
gathered. 
24 In his Computer viruses: Presentation for technology training corporation, Spafford 
(1990, p. 5) states that "less than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections." We have no 
information on how the data are gathered, although others (e.g., Borrett, 1990, p. 38) 
have presented similar observations. This paper treats Spafford's observation as a 
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the view that currently there exists a nnrumum of 374 viruses, Spafford's 
speculation really means that a very small amount of viruses actually account for a 
large percentage of the infections. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The present study was descriptive (Isaac & Michael, 1981, p. 46; McMillan et al., 
1989, p. 33) in nature in that a fact-finding survey based on questionnaires and 
standardized interviews was conducted in selected government organizations in 
Western Australia in order to obtain data on which the research findings can be 
based. 
The data gathering instrument for the present study was a standardized 
questionnaire which, in large part, comprises limited choice questions directed at 
obtaining such information as infection rates of various types of computer viruses. 
The questionnaire was chosen as the data gathering instrument because it is 
relatively economical, has standardized questions, and questions can be tailored for 
specific purposes of the study (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 254; Isaac et al., 1981, p. 
130). 
To ensure correct interpretation of the questions - so that the potential for 
subjectivity and bias can be reduced - and encourage a high response rate the 
standardized questionnaire was administered by interview. If necessary, responses 
were probed, followed up, clarified, and elaborated during the interview in order to 
achieve specific, accurate responses (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 266). 
speculation rather than a hypothesis because it does not meet the hypothesis criteria, as 
suggested by McMillan and Schumacher (1989, p. 90 ff.) and Tm;:kman (1988, p. 62). 
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The purpose of the study was: 
• To collect detailed factual information of the Western Australian 
environment that describes existing phenomena (e.g., Is a given 
population being infected by IBM PC viruses? If yes, what type of 
virus is infecting the given population and what is the rate of 
infection of that particular virus for the given population? Does 
reinfection occur? Which categories does the virus fall into?); 
• To test the validity of Spafford's speculation within the Western 
Australian environment (i.e. Is it true that less than 10 viruses 
account for 90% of infections in Western Australia?); 
• To identify problems (e.g. How is the virus introduced? Who is the 
perpetrator?); 
• To determine what other people are doing with similar problems or 
situations and benefit from their experience in making future plans 
and decisions; and 
• To help determine that the problem a given population is facing is 
definitely caused by a virus. 
1.3 Statement of Research Questions 
It was the purpose of this study to investigate the infection types and rates of IBM 
PC viruses in selected government organizations of Western Australia. In addition, 
the present study aimed at testing the validity of Spafford's speculation that less 
than 10 viruses (out of a minimum of374) account for 90% of all infections. 
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1.3.1 Subsidiary questions 
1. Does reinfection of systems occur? If yes, what is the reinfection rate? 
2. Which categories does the virus fall into? (i.e., is it a boot infector, system 
infector, application infector for PC, etc.?) 
3. How is the virus introduced? Who is the perpetrator? 
1.3.2 Terms 
Infection types. The type of a computer virus. For example, is the virus a 
boot sector infector, a COM files infector, or is of any other types? 
Infection rates. The rate of infection of a particular type of computer 
virus. For example, the infection rate of boot sector infector viruses is, say, 
10%. 
IBM PC. The term "IBM PC" is used here to include the IBM XT, AT, 
PS/2 and compatibles. 
Virus. The term "virus" ts used here synonymously with the term 
"computer virus." See section 1.1.3 for a definition of a computer virus. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The research is significant in that it focussed attention on the problem of definition 
and then identification of a computer virus. As noted earlier, there is no general 
agreement in the computer community on the definition of a computer virus. Thus, 
gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses is complicated by the fact that 
the definitions used by the various entities involved are ambiguous and vary widely 
in their specifications. 
Secondly, confusion abounds in reporting regarding the number of known 
computer viruses. There are viruses and there are often "mutations" of these 
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viruses. The many ways in which a researcher can classify these mutations is the 
main reason for the disparity in the number of viruses being reported. 25 Also, there 
appears to be competition among some of the researchers working in the computer 
virus field to announce a greater number of known viruses than anyone else. 26 
Thus, gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses can be complicating in that 
given any two viruses, one cannot always be assured that they are not the same. To 
resolve this problem, this study adopted the number of virus samples gathered by 
Virus Bulletin and used that classification system (see Appendix 1). In essence, this 
study recognized that currently there exists a minimum of 374 distinctly different 
viruses affecting IBM PC, XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles. 
Thirdly, it seems evident ("News track", 1991, p. 9; Wilding, 1991a, p. 2; 
Fites et al., 1992, p. 53) that the incidence of real world computer virus infections 
is increasing at an alarming rate. The growth of this problem is of limited interest if 
the viruses are quarantined in laboratories and unless the samples listed manifest 
25 For example, one attribute of the Brain virus is to write "Brain" as the label on an 
infected disk. If another virus is found that writes "Hello" as the disk label but is 
identical in every other respect, does one count this as a new virus? The code of both are 
the same but only five ASCII characters have been changed. Some researchers have 
taken an easy way out. If there is any change in the critical code of a virus, no matter 
how slight, they count it as a new virus. Others feel that so long as any two viruses have 
identical code and do not behave differently, they are variants of the original virus. 
Depending upon what one chooses to recognize as separate viruses the total 
number of separately identifiable IBM PC viruses is somewhere between 800 and 1300 
as of March 1992. 
26 This phenomenon is perhaps exacerbated by the myopic view that "the more computer 
viruses one can list, the greater an authority he [or she] is on the subject" (Highland, 
1990, p. 29). 
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themselves in the real world there is no real problem. Unfortunately, according to 
Wilding (1991a, p. 2), the editor of Virus Bulletin, "this is exactly what is 
happening, with more and more different specimens being encountered." Again, 
gathering and analyzing data on computer viruses is further complicated by the fact 
that the number of computer viruses are increasing at a dramatic rate. 
Fourthly, there is no specific study similar to the nature of the present study 
being conducted in Australia in general, and in Western Australia in particular. As a 
result, there is very limited existing data to extrapolate and build upon. The present 
study is thus significant in that factual information regarding the nature and 
prevalence of the IBM PC viruses problem in the Western Australia environment 
can be added. 
In addition, an attempt has been made to link this research with Spafford's 
(1990) speculation so that at the end of the study, the validity of Spafford's 
speculation within the Western Australian environment could be verified. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter One of this thesis gives a brief introduction to the nature of the present 
study and deals with the technical preliminaries of this study. This chapter will 
familiarize the reader with basic terminology and fundamental issues address in the 
present study. 
Chapter Two deals with the review of relevant research and literature. This 
chapter contains a review of general literature on computer viruses, specific studies 
similar to the present study, and the research design of the present study. 
Chapter Three provides the theoretical framework of this study: what are 
the variables impacting on the research questions? What are the assumptions 
underpinning this study? 
26 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Chapter Four describes the method of investigation for this study. This 
chapter contains a brief description of: the research design for this study, the 
instruments used, the population of this study, the ethical considerations for this 
study, the data analysis procedures, and the limitations of this study. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the survey conducted for this study. It 
is divided into four sections to cover the organizational profile, the use of IBM PC 
in the organizations surveyed, IBM PC viruses past experience in the 
organizations, and the .IBM PC virus control mechanisms and procedures in place 
in the organizations surveyed. 
Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the implications of the results 
gathered from the survey. 
Chapter Seven gives a brief summary of the findings of the survey 
conducted for this study, provides suggestions for further research on this area of 
study, and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of Literature 
2.1 General Literature on Computer Viruses 
There have been many newspaper and trade press articles about computer viruses -
although often misleading and inaccurate (Highland, 1988a; Simons, 1989, p. 105) 
- but there has been little technical material published except in Virus Bulletin and 
Compu.ters & Security.21 The nature of computer security is such that published 
material tends to be quite limited. 
2.1.1 Conceptual foundations and defence 
The following are important technical research papers regarding the conceptual 
foundations of computer viruses, design of virus defences, and the spread of 
computer viruses: 
• Dr. Frederick Cohen's (1984) "Computer viruses: Theory and 
experiments," presented at 1FIP/Sec'84 in Toronto, Canada in September 
27 This is a leading international journal addressing security issues, audit control, and data 
integrity relating to all data processing equipment: mainframe, mini and 
microcomputers. Each issue contains refereed articles on relevant subjects, special 
features, and summaries of articles published elsewhere. 
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1984; and his subsequent ( 1986) doctoral dissertation. 28 A generic example 
(i.e., template) for a virus, formulated in pseudo-Pascal and adapted from 
the one given by Cohen (1984), is given by Leiss (1990, p. 39). 
• Rudiger Dierstein's (1987) "Computer viruses: A secret threat," presented 
at SECURICOM held in Paris, France during March 1986. This article 
provides an insight into the structure, propagation and function of 
computer viruses, and explores the systems environment in which viruses 
are created and proliferate. 
• Dr. Ian H. Witten's (1987) "Computer (ln)security: Infiltrating open 
systems," that appeared in the summer 1987 issue of Abacus. In this article, 
Witten describes an impressive array of methods both for securing and for 
attacking computers. The article also explains how viruses and worms 
work, and how they can be created. 
• Dr. Winfried Gleissner's (1989) "A mathematical theory for the spread of 
computer viruses" that appeared in Computers & Security. This article 
introduces a model to treat the spread of computer viruses mathematically. 
Two additional articles about computer viruses appeared during the summer of 
1987, according to Highland (1990, p. 295). They were "Taxonomy of computer 
virus defence mechanisms" by Catherine L. Young and "Computer viruses: Myth 
or reality?" by Howard Israel. Both were in the Proceedings of the 10th National 
Computer Security Conference that was held in September 1987. 
28 Cohen, generally regarded as the "father" of computer viruses, published much of the 
original work on computer viruses starting in 1983, which was mostly theoretical and 
highly mathematical based. 
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2.1.2 Prevention 
Prevention refers to the ability to ensure that an uninfected system remains 
uninfected. Cohen (1984) gives a discussion of flow controls as a means of 
guarding against computer viruses. Some approaches based on the imperviousness 
of hardware to remote manipulation are given by Routh (1984) and Davis & 
Gantenbein (1987). Other papers of interest are provided by Highland (1988b, 
1988c, 1988d), Fak (1988), Pozzo & Gray (1987), Wiseman, (1989), Zajac, 
(1990), Murray (1988) and Cohen (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990). 
2.2 Specific Studies Similar to the Current Study 
There is no doubt that there is a real threat of computer viruses but there is a 
dearth of information regarding the prevalence and the types of different viruses. 
Data exists in the U.S. in some states and periodic data comes from the U.K. but 
there is limited systematic data from Australia, apart from ACARB's periodic 
profile of computer abuse in Australia, which categorizes computer viruses as one 
of many forms of computer abuse. 
2.2.1 ACARB's 1990 profile of computer abuse in Australia 
As a non-profit public organization, ACARB sees itself in an ideal position to serve 
the business community "as a catalyst in the synthesis of knowledge in the 
[ computer abuse] area, as a researcher in the evaluation and development of 
preventative means, and as a forum for the exchange of ideas. "29 (Kamay et al., 
1990, p. 29). 
29 ACARB regularly publishes a profile of the extent and nature of computer abuse in 
Australia in which factual information is gathered in an attempt to quantify this 
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2.2.1.1 Summary of ACARB's 1990 Figures 
The following tables, adapted from Kamay et al. (1989, 1990) and Bright (1989), 
have been updated from cases notified to, and documented by, ACARB during the 
period from February 1989 to May 1990. The tables provided are of two types~ 
viz., the period to date figures that represent the details of cases notified to 
ACARB from February 1989 to May 1990, and figures that update the total 
number and values of cases notified to AC ARB ( and prior to its formation CIT-
CARB at the Caulfied Institute of Technology) since 1978. 
Table 1 
Type of Computer Abuse in Australia (February 1989 to May 1990) 
Classification Count Known $ Value of Percent of Average 
Value Loss Value $ Loss 
Computer Related Fraud 2 2 1,oso,000 64.30 525,000 
Unauthorised Use 2 0 0 0 
Hacking 3 1 5,000 0.01 5,000 
Theft of Output 
Sabotage 1 1 0 0 
Masterfile Destroyed 
Theft of Equipment 14 14 527,776 32. 40 37,698 
Electronic Funds 2 1 32,500 2.00 32,500 
Virus 
Total 
33 1 17,920 1.10 17,920 
57 20 $1,633,196 100.00% $81,660 
phenomenon, determine any trends in its development and thereby provide a 
biographical sketch or profile of computer abuse in Australia. 
ACARB also publishes a regular Newsletter/Research Report (the ACARB 
Newsletter and the ACARB Research Report) which includes papers of interest and 
periodic statistical profiles of computer abuse in Australia in order to enable business to 
understand trends that are occurring. In addition, ACARB produces the Computer Risks 
Update which compiles material on current and potential risks, descriptions of viruses 
and other forms of attack, potential remedies, brief details of new books and other 
publication, new anti-viral and other security products and so forth. 
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Table 2 
Type of Computer Abuse in Australia (as of May 1990) 
Classification Count Known $ Value of Percent of Average 
Value Loss Value $ Loss 
Computer Related Fraud 92 63 12,052,034 79. 2 191,302 
Unauthorised Use 52 17 57,600 o.o 3,388 
Hacking 29 4 18,3GO 0.0 4,575 
Theft of Output 17 4 250,000 1.6 62,500 
Sabotage 13 4 903,000 5.9 225,750 
Masterfile Destroyed 4 2 900 o.o 450 
Theft of Equipment 48 44 1,247,976 8.2 28,363 
Electronic Funds 13 11 664,625 4. 4 60,420 
Virus 45 2 18,620 o.o 9,310 
Total 313 151 $15,213,055 100.0% $100,749 
Table 2 shows that the total number of cases reported by ACARB to date is 
313, resulting in a loss of $15,213,055 from 151 assessable cases. 162 cases were 
unassessable with an unknown loss. The average loss from the 151 assessable cases 
was $100,749. 
Incidentally, Table 1 shows that the greatest number of reported cases over 
the period from February 1989 to May 1990 has involved the category of viruses. 
This category represents 59% of the reported cases in the period. 
2.2.1.2 Types of Abuse 
Tables 1 and 2 categorise computer abuse by type according to nine categories; 
viz., computer related fraud, unauthorised used, hacking, theft of output, sabotage, 
masterfile destroyed, electronic funds transfer, computer virus, and theft of 
equipment. The meanings of the heading in Tables 1 and 2 is as follows: 
Count. Total number of incidences reported. 
Known value. Total number of incidences with a known dollar loss. 
Value of Loss. Total value ofloss for that category. 
32 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Percent of Value. The percentage of that category against the total of all 
categories. 
Figure 2 on page 35 shows the percentage of various types of abuse, by number of 
occurrences over the twelve year period (1978 - 1990) of data collection. Figure 3 
on page 36 reflects the continued and stable growth of the nine categories of 
computer abuse over the past two years. Although ACARB's figures do not 
necessarily show the complete extent of computer abuse in Australia, it is 
important to note that the factual evidence that exists in the profile shows stable 
trends over this period of time. 
2.2.1.3 Computer Viruses As Computer Abuse 
Computer viruses are a form of computer abuse that is arguably more insidious 
than any other, and represents the fastest growing category of abuse in terms of the 
frequency of occurrence over the past two years in Australia. It amounts to 59% of 
the cases of computer abuse in the current period. While it amounts to only 1 % of 
the monetary losses from computer abuse, 30 the cost of this activity may lie more 
with the value an organization places on data and information that may be lost on 
floppy and hard disk, and any subsequent loss of business opportunities and 
productivity. Such factors are additional to the cost of time that is often required 
for technicians to recover information or rebuild a hard disk. Hence, it is hard to 
quantify the value of losses associated with viruses. 
It is evident (Kamay et al., 1990, p. 16) from the documented cases by 
ACARB of known viruses that they utilise relatively few methods of operation with 
the most likely outcome being the destruction of information on a floppy or hard 
30 It should be noted that the 1% is based on a small sample of 1 (see Table 1) and is 
therefore not a good indicator of cost. 
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disk. A notable change in the character of viruses has occurred over the period 
from February 1989 to May 1990, as Kamay et al. (1990, p. 16) observed, "has 
been their increasing level of sophistication which has led to greater difficulty in 
their detection and removal, and their greater virulence and destructive impact." 
This observation is in general agreement with Wilding's (1991a~ p. 2) findings. 
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2.2.2 Dataquest's 1991 computer virus market survey 
One of the most revealing sessions of the 1991 NCSA (National Computer 
Security Association) Anti-Virus Product Developers Conference in Washington, 
D.C. was the publication of a Computer Virus Market Survey undertaken by 
Dataquest (Hruska, 1992; Monk, 1992). The survey aims to identify the nature and 
the extent of computer virus problem on PCs in the U.S. During October 1991, 
602 corporate end-users were interviewed by telephone during October 1991. All 
interviews were conducted on sites with 300 or more PCs and the majority of 
respondents were responsible for controlling the virus problem on all the PCs. The 
findings of the survey, adapted from Hruska ( 1992, p. 7) and Monk ( 1992, p. 5), 
are summarized below: 
• 63% of respondents reported at least one encounter with a virus over the 
past year, and 9% had more than 25 PCs infected in the process; 
• New Zealand (or Stoned or Marijuana) was responsible for 48% of the 
attacks, Jerusalem (or Friday the 13th) for 37% and Joshi for 8%; 
• The major entry points of viruses into the organizations surveyed were 
disks brought from home PCs (43%), followed by the virus-infected 
programs pulled down from bulletin boards (7%) and demonstration disks 
and service engineers (6%). Only 1% of infections came with the PC from 
the dealer or the factory; 
• When asked to estimate the cost of each virus infection, 3 1 % of 
organizations spent less than $2,000, 29% between $2,000 and $10,000, 
while 7% spent more than a staggering $100,000. 
A comparison between the findings ofDataquest's 1991 survey in the U.S. and the 
findings of this study is provided in section 6.3.S of this paper. 
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2.2.3 Virus Bulletin's February 1992 virus prevalence table 
A Virus Prevalence Table, produced from statistics collated by Virus Bulletin, is 
featured in each edition of the bulletin showing the prevalence of different viruses 
in the U.K. during the preceding month. 
The following Virus Prevalence Table, adapted from Wildin~ (1992, p. 6), 
shows recorded virus infections reported to Virus Bulletin in the U.K. during 
February 1992. However, it should be noted that Wilding (1991) maintains that: 
the figures shown in these tables do not accurately portray the full 
extent of the problem in the U.K. as they do not include statistics 
from the myriad of other agencies involved in combating computer 
viruses. (p. 4) 
Table 3 
Virus Bulletin's February 1992 Virus Prevalence Table 
Virus Incidents Total Reports 
New Zealand II 11 20.3% 
Form 11 20.3% 
Tequila 7 12. 9% 
Michelangelo 4 7.4% 
Spanish Telecom 3 5.5% 
Cascade 2 3.7% 
Vacsina 2 3. 7% 
Maltese Amoeba 2 3. 7% 
Flip 2 3. 7% 
Brain 2 3.7% 
1575 1 1. 8% 
DIR II 1 1. 8% 
Liberty 1 1. 8% 
Anticad 2576 1 1. 8% 
Joshi 1 1. 8% 
Total 54 100% 
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2.3 Literature on Methodology 
The present study was descriptive in nature in that a survey based on 
questionnaires and interviews was conducted. The literature of surveys design and 
techniques (Fink & Kosecoff, 1985; Fowler, 1984; Isaac et al., 1981; Borg & Gall, 
1979; Campbell & Katona, 1953), of questionnaire design (Borg, 1963; 
Oppenheim, 1966), and of interview techniques (Borg, 1963; Kerlinger, 1973) 
were therefore expected to be relevant. 
Research papers of interest and periodic statistical profiles of computer 
abuse in Australia that ACARB publishes regularly was also consulted as 
appropriate during the design of the questionnaire. 
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Variables Impacting on the Research Questions 
Since the research was descriptive in nature, no "independent", "dependent" 
variable need be identified because " [ descriptive research] does not involve 
manipulation of independent variables" (McMillan et al., 1989, p. 282). The 
purpose and the logic of this study determined that there was only one variable of 
interest to the present study; viz., the infection rates and types of different IBM PC 
viruses. All of the state government organizations of Western Australia comprised 
the designated population of the study. (See Appendix 6 for a list of the surveyed 
organizations.) 
The 3 7 4 known IBM PC viruses ( as of July 1991) gathered by the Virus 
Bulletin (Wilding, 1991b) are categorised into the following seven types: 
• The COM files infector; 
• The EXE files infector; 
• The DOS boot sector31 infector; 
• The master boot sector32 infector; 
• Not memory-resident after infection virus; 
31 This is logical sector O in each DOS partition. 
32 This is the sector stored at absolute track 0, head 0, sector 1. 
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• Memory-resident33 after infection virus; and 
• Companion virus. 34 
A somewhat similar classification method is provided in Virus Characteristics List 
V89B, a software documentation that comes with the 1992 version of McAfee 
Associates' antiviral software, VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992). All unique IBM 
PC viruses are categorised into the following ten types: 
• Virus uses Stealth Techniques; 
• Virus uses self-encryption; 
• Virus installs itselfin memory (i.e., memory-resident); 
• Virus infects COMMAND.COM; 
• Virus infects COM files; 
• Virus infects EXE files; 
• Virus infects Overlay files; 
• Virus infects floppy diskette boot; 
• Virus infects fixed disk boot sector; and 
• Virus infects fixed disk partition table. 35 
33 This implies that, once a single infected program has been run, the virus potentially can 
spread to any or all programs in the system. This spreading occurs during the entire 
work session (until the system is rebooted to clear the virus from memory), rather than 
during a small period of time when the infected program is executing viral code. 
34 The term "companion virus" describes any computer virus which locates an EXE file 
and then creates a new program in the same directory with a COM extension (Wilding, 
1990b, p. 3). This bogus COM file contains the virus code and is invoked before the 
legitimate EXE file executes. 
3 s Fixed ( or hard) disk partition table ( or record) ( aka master boot record) is the 64-byte 
table contained at the end of the master boot sector. 
41 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
For the present study, it was determined that the classification method used by 
VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992) is more appropriate since it covered a wider 
range and is somewhat more updated. Thus, all unique IBM PC viruses that are 
known to infect the responding organizations would be categorised into the 10 
infection types advocated by VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992). 
3.2 Assumptions Underpinning the Study 
The present study assumed that: 
1. IBM PC viruses do exist and pose a form of computer abuse in the Western 
Australian environment. 
2. information about IBM PC viruses within selected organizations can be 
obtained during the interview. 
3. the respondents realise that the problem of IBM PC virus infection does 
exist in their respective organizations and recognise the types of infecting 
viruses. 
4. the respondents have reliable information with regards to their 
organization's IBM PC viruses infection rates. 
5. no one guesses or presents an uninformed answer when answering the 
questionnaire during the interview. 
6. the respondents will be cooperative and that they will produce unbiased and 
truthful responses during the interview. 
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Chapter Four 
Method of Investigation 
4.1 Design of the Study 
As stated, the research was descriptive in nature in that a survey based on 
questionnaires and interviews was conducted for the study. The study was initiated 
with the view that it will stand or fall on the extent to which it can add 
convincingly to knowledge about the present status of the IBM PC viruses problem 
in the Western Australian environment. In addition, the study has made an attempt 
to investigate Spafford's speculation within the Western Australian environment. 
4.2 Description of Instruments Used 
Data on which the research findings will be based were obtained from a survey of 
selected state government organizations. The data gathering instrument was a 
locally developed questionnaire which, in large part, comprises limited choice 
questions directed at obtaining such information as type of virus and infection 
rates. (The questionnaire is appended as Appendix 2). The questionnaire was 
standardized so that information from each respondent is gathered in the same 
manner. The standardized questionnaire was used by the interviewer as a basis for 
the interview so that the potential for subjectivity and bias can be reduced. The 
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participants were assisted by the interviewer in identifying the types of infecting 
viruses when the need arise. 
As with other descriptive research, there is no assurance that all questions 
in the questionnaire will be understood. In the present study, this problem was 
recognised and to this end it was intended that the questionnaire was carefully field 
tested to eliminate ambiguous or biased items and to improve format, both for ease 
of understanding and facility in analyzing results. Furthermore, any inquiries the 
respondents might have regarding the questionnaire during the interview have been 
answered by the interviewer. 
4.3 Population of the Study 
Before the commencement of the study, the official list of the address of all the 
state government organizations and the name of a contact person was sought from 
State I. T. Division, Department of State Services. Since the population of the 
study was not sufficiently large (n = 48), a letter of transmittal was sent to all of 
the 48 prospective participants to request their participations in the survey. (A 
sample letter of transmittal is included in Appendix 3.) Confirmation of 
participation was sought through telephone calls. 
4.4 Survey Response Rate 
A very high response rate (87.5%, n = 42) for the study has been achieved. This is 
taken as an assurance that adequate representation of the state government sector 
for the study is achieved and that the survey results is truly representative of the 
state government sector. (See Appendix 6 for a list of the organizations.) 
Of the six (12.5%) organizations that refused to participate in the study: 
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• 3 ( 50%) of them declined to give any reason of their refusal to 
participate; 
• 2 (33.33%) of them said they were too busy with their work to be 
able to participate; and 
• 1 (16.67%) of them cited the organization has a written policy 
never to participate in any study of this nature. 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
Prior to commencement of the study, approval was sought from the University 
Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research since the study involves human 
subjects. (The approval letter is included in Appendix 4.) 
Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and subjects were free to 
withdraw their consent at any stage of the study. During the interview, subjects 
were informed of the purpose of the study, that there will be no compulsion to 
participate in the study and that they will be free to withdraw from further 
participation in the study at any time. 
In keeping with the policies of the university's Committee for the Conduct 
of Ethical Research, a copy of the Form of Disclosure and Informed Consent was 
made available to participants for their records. (The written statement is included 
in Appendix 5.) 
Although number identification on the questionnaires was used to allow 
easy recording of data, participants were not identified by name. Completed 
questionnaires were seen only by this researcher, usef for the purpose of this study 
only and were destroyed at the end of the study. 
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4.6 Data Analysis Procedures 
When the data on which the research findings will be based were gathered from the 
survey, the infection rate of each of the individual infecting viruses were then 
tabulated. Once the infection rate of each of the infecting viruses was tabulated, it 
was relatively easy to validate whether Spafford's speculation that less than 10 
viruses account for 90% of infections was applicable in this environment. The 
reinfection rate of the infecting viruses were then determined from the available 
data gathered from the survey. 
4. 7 Limitations of the Study 
Isaac ( 1981) argues that, with the exception of surveys based on a search of 
records: 
surveys are dependent on direct communication with persons having 
characteristics, behaviours, attitudes, and other relevant information 
appropriate for a specific investigation. (p. 128) 
This, Isaac (1981, p. 128) contends, "make them reactive in nature; i.e., they 
directly involve the respondent in the assessment process by eliciting a reaction." It 
should be noted that reactive methods run many risks of generating misleading 
information although they are often the most cost-effective, efficient, and credible 
means of collecting data. These risks, adapted from Isaac ( 1981 ), include: 
• Surveys only tap respondents who are accessible and cooperative; 
• Surveys often make the respondent feel special or unnatural and 
thus produce responses that are artificial or slanted; 
• Surveys arouse "response sets" such as acquiescence or a proneness 
to agree with positive statements or questions; 
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• Surveys are vulnerable to over-rater or under-rater bias - the 
tendency for some respondents to give consistently high or low 
ratings; and 
• In the case of interviews, biased reactions can be elicited because of 
the characteristics of the interviewer or respondent, or the 
combination, that elicit an unduly favourable or unfavourable 
pattern of responses (p. 128). 
The present study is thus delimited by these risks. 
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Chapter Five 
Results of the Survey 
5.1 Organization Profiles 
The first section of the questionnaire was designed to obtain information regarding 
the number of PC users, the volume and the size of each organization surveyed. 
5. 1.1 Industrial groupings 
In terms of industrial groupings, all the respondents of the survey were from W.A. 
State Government departments and organizations. The high response rate (87.5%, 
n = 42) for the survey assures reasonble representation. 
5.1.2 Size of the organizations 
It is difficult to determine the size and in turn the computer activity in a particular 
organization and one of the criteria used was to examine the expenditure of the 
organization. The size of the organizations in terms of gross annual budget in $A is 
set out in Table 4. 
Table 4 reveals that half of the organizations (50%) have a budget of under 
$100 million. In terms of gross annual budget, the organizations have an average of 
$121.08 million with a standard deviation (S.D.) of $244.51 million. However, it 
should be noted that one organization has a very large budget ( over $1000 
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million). If this organization were excluded from the calculation, the average gross 
annual budget of the organizations will be $81.12 million, with a S.D. of $125.12 
million. These figures, ignoring the exceptional case, are believed to be more 
representative. 
Table 4 also shows that a significant number, approximately one third 
(33.33%) of the respondents could not, or chose not, to answer this question. This 
can be attributed to the fact that many respondents of the survey are technical 
personnel who can answer questions pertinent to the virus infection in their 
respective organizations but who may not have the necessary information regarding 
the financial status of their organizations. 
Table 4 
Size of Organizations In Terms of Gross Annual Budget 
Budget 
($ Millions) 
Not Available 
Under 50 
51 - 100 
101 - 200 
201 - 300 
301 - 400 
401 - 500 
Over 1000 
Total 
Mean= $121.08 million 
Standard Deviation= $244.51 million 
5.1.3 Number of staff 
Number of 
Respondents 
14 
17 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
42 
Percentage 
33.33 
40.48 
9.52 
4.76 
2.38 
4.76 
2.38 
2.38 
100.00 
Another indicator of size of the organization is the number of staff employed which 
also represents an indication of the likely computer activity. The number of 
full-time staff in each organization is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that the majority of the organizations (52.38%) employed 
between 51 and 300 employees. The average number of staff in the organizations is 
839 (round off to the next digit). 
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Table 5 
Number of Staff in the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage 
Staff Respondents 
Not Available 1 2.38 
Under 50 2 4.76 
51 - 100 8 19.05 
101 - 200 9 21. 43 
201 - 300 5 11. 90 
301 - 400 1 2.38 
4 01 - 500 2 4.76 
501 - 750 3 7.14 
751 - 1000 4 9.52 
Over 1000 7 16.67 
42 100.00 
Mean= 838.22 = 839 
Standard Deviation= 1357.93 = 1358 
5.1.4 Computing (or computer services or IT) section 
A separate computing ( or computer services or IT) section is maintained m 3 8 
(90.48%) of the 42 organizations. The size of computing sections in terms of 
staffing is set out in Table 6. The majority of the organizations (66.67%) employed 
between 1 and 30 staff in their respective computing sections. On average, the 
number of staff employed in each computing section is 25. 
Table 6 
Number of Staff in Computing Section of the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage 
Staff Respondents 
1 - 10 22 57. 8 9 
11 - 20 2 5.26 
21 - 30 4 10.53 
31 - 40 1 2.63 
41 - 50 1 2.63 
51 - 60 2 5.26 
61 - 70 3 7.89 
71 - 80 1 2.63 
81 - 90 1 2.63 
91 - 100 1 2.63 
38 100.00 
Mean= 24.34 = 25 
Standard Deviation= 28.19 = 29 
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5.2 Profile of the IBM PC Use 
To understand the computer virus infection incidents it was necessary to obtain 
information regarding the profile of PC use within an organisation. Such relevant 
information would include the number of PCs in use and the number of users. It is 
also to determine whether the systems are nertworked or operated on a standalone 
basis. 
5.2.1 Number of IBM PC 
The number of IBM PC each of the organizations possessed is listed in Table 7, 
which shows that the majority of them (59.52%) have between 1 and 100 PCs. On 
average, the number of IBM PC each organization owns is 170 with a S.D. of 208. 
The large standard deviation can be attributed to the fact that the data are 
"positively skewed" (i.e., organizations tend to have small number of PCs) and not 
spread in a normal distribution. 
Table 7 
Number of IBM PC in the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage 
IBM PC Respondents 
1 - 25 10 23.81 
25 - 50 7 16.67 
51 - 100 8 19.05 
101 - 150 4 9.52 
151 - 200 3 7.14 
201 - 300 2 4.76 
301 - 400 1 2.38 
401 - 500 2 4.76 
Over 500 5 11. 90 
42 100.00 
Mean= 169.57 = 170 
Standard Deviation= 207.51 = 208 
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5.2.2 Number of Apple Macintosh 
Although this survey was not examining computer viruses associated with Apple 
Macintosh PCs it was considered worthwhile to gain an understanding of the 
penetration of Apple Macintosh computers compared to IBM PCs in this particular 
environment to consider whether research into Apple Macintosh viruses could be 
justified. 
As it transpired, 24 (57.14%) of the 42 surveyed organizations own one or 
more Apple Macintosh computers. For those organizations that possess at least 
one Apple Macintosh, the number of Apple Macintosh each of them owned is set 
out in Table 8. 
The majority of the organizations (54.17%) have between 1 and 5 Apple 
Macintoshs computers. On average, the number of Apple Macintosh computers the 
organizations own is 59. However, it should be noted that there is an organization 
which has a very large number of Apple Macintosh (approximately 1000). If this 
organization were excluded from the calculation, the number of Apple Macintosh 
in each organization, on average, will be 18, with a S.D. of 37. These figures are 
believed to be more reflective of the existing situation. 
Table 8 
Number of Apple Macintosh in the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage 
Apple Macintosh Respondents 
1 - 5 13 54.17 
6 - 10 3 12.50 
11 - 15 3 12.50 
16 - 20 1 4.17 
21 - 25 0 0.00 
26 - 50 1 4.17 
51 - 100 1 4.17 
Over 100 2 8.33 
24 100.00 
Mean= 58.21 = 59 
Standard Deviation= 203.68 = 204 
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5.2.3 Number of IBM PC users 
The number of staff that are IBM PC users on a regular basis in the organizations 
is shown in Table 9. The majority of the organizations (54.76%) have between 1 
and 100 staff that are regular IBM PC users. On average, the number of staff that 
are regular IBM PC users in the organizations is 215. 
Table 9 
Number of Staff That Use IBM PC Regularly In the Organizations 
Number of Number of 
IBM PC User Respondents 
1 - 25 10 
25 - 50 5 
51 - 100 8 
101 - 150 4 
151 - 200 2 
201 - 300 2 
301 - 400 3 
401 - 500 2 
Over 500 6 
42 
Mean= 214.19 = 215 
Standard Deviation= 276.40 = 277 
5.2.4 Number of Apple Macintosh users 
Percentage 
23.81 
11. 90 
19.05 
9.52 
4. 76 
4.76 
7.14 
4. 7 6 
14.29 
100.00 
Twenty two (52.38%) of the 42 surveyed organizations have one or more staff that 
are regular Apple Macintosh users. For those organizations that possess at least 
one Apple Macintosh, the number of staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users is 
set out in Table 10. The majority of the organizations (72.73%) have between 1 
and 15 staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users. On average, the number of 
staff that are regular Apple Macintosh users in the organizations is 75. However, it 
should be noted that there is an organization which has a very large number of staff 
that are regular Apple Macintosh user (approximately 1200). If this organization 
were excluded from the calculation, the number of staff that are regular Apple 
Macintosh users in the organizations, on average, will be 22, with a S.D. of 38. 
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Table 10 
Number of Staff That Use Apple Macintosh Regularly In the Organizations 
Number of Apple 
Macintosh User 
1 - 5 
6 - 10 
11 - 15 
16 - 20 
21 - 25 
26 - 50 
51 - 100 
Over 100 
Mean= 74.64 = 75 
Standard Deviation= 253.94 = 254 
Number of 
Respondents 
7 
5 
4 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
22 
Percentage 
31.82 
22.73 
18.18 
9.09 
0.00 
4.55 
4.55 
9.09 
100.00 
5.2.5 Time/or which the organiza.tions have been using IBM PC 
The length of time for which the organizations have been using IBM PCs 1s 
summarised in Table 11, which shows that the majority of the organizations have 
been using IBM PCs for between 6 and 8 years. 
Table 11 
Years For Which the Organizations Have Been Using IBM PC 
Years 
Not Available 
Under 3 years 
3 - 5 years 
6 - 8 years 
Over 8 years 
5.2. 6 Network connections 
Number of 
Respondents 
2 
1 
9 
19 
11 
42 
Percentage 
4.76 
2.38 
21. 43 
45.24 
26.19 
100.00 
In 28 (66.67%) of the 42 organizations, at least one networking system is in place. 
The number of separate networking systems in use in the organizations is 
summarised in Table 12. There are a total of 63 separate networking systems in 
used in the 28 organizations. 
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Table 12 
Number of Separate Networking Systems In Use in the Organizations 
Number of Separate Number of Percentage Total Number of 
Networking Systems Respondents Networking 
Systems 
1 15 53.57 15 
2 7 25.00 14 
3 3 10. 71 9 
4 1 3.57 4 
9 1 3.57 9 
12 1 3.57 12 
28 100.00 63 
5.2. 7 Number of IBM PC in each of the networks in the organizations 
The number of IBM PCs in each of the 63 networking systems in the organizations 
is summarised in Table 13. The majority of the networking systems (72.13%) have 
between I and 30 IBM PCs linked to it. On average, the number of IBM PCs that 
are linked to the networks in the organizations is 50. 
Table 13 
Number of IBM PC in the Networking Systems of the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage 
IBM PC Respondents 
Not Available 2 3.17 
1 - 10 11 17.46 
11 - 20 14 22.22 
21 
-
30 19 30.16 
31 - 50 7 11.11 
51 - 100 4 6.35 
101 - 200 4 6.35 
Over 200 2 3.17 
63 100.00 
Mean= 49.51 = 50 
Standard Deviation= 97.81 = 98 
5.2.8 Use of network operating systems in the organizations 
The network operating system (NOS) of the 63 networking systems m the 
organizations is set out in Table 14. 
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Table 14 
Network Operating System of the Networking Systems in the Organizations 
Network Operating Number of Percentage 
System Respondents 
Not Available 8 12.70 
Novell NetWare 26 41. 27 
3Com 3+ Open 11 17.46 
IBM OS/2 LAN Server 7 11.11 
PC NFS 4 6.35 
IBM LAN Manager 3 4.76 
LANTastic 1 1. 59 
Banyan VINES 1 1. 59 
Microsoft LAN Manager 1 1. 59 
Pathwork 1 1. 59 
63 100.00 
5.2.9 Effect of non-availability of networks in the organizations 
The effect of non-availability of each networking system in the organizations is 
summarised in Table 15. 
Table 15 
Effect of Non-availability of Networks in the Organizations 
Effect 
Minimal 
Inconvenience 
Major 
5.2.10 External connections 
Number of 
Respondents 
14 
7 
42 
63 
Percentage 
22.22 
11.11 
66.67 
100.00 
In 15 (35.71%) of the 42 organizations, external dial-in capabilities are allowed. 
Only 4 (26.67%) of the 15 organizations use a dial-back system to allow only 
access from an approved list of numbers. Nine (81.82%) out of the 11 
organizations that do not use the dial-back system are relying on the password 
mechanism to prevent unauthorised access. In addition to password protection, 
three (27.27%) other organizations disclosed that the use of a dial-back system is 
unnecessary because all external person can only dial into a single stand-alone 
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personal computer within the organization. One (9.09%) other organization 
revealed that the use of dial-back system is unnecessary because the dial-in 
capabilities are normally disabled and are not used very frequently. 
5.3 IBM PC Virus Problem Experience 
5.3.1 Seriousness of the IBM PC viruses problem in the organizations 
The following table summarises the perceived seriousness of the IBM PC viruses 
problem in the organizations. Of particular note is that the majority of the 
respondents (57.14%) believe that IBM PC viruses only pose a minor problem in 
their respective organizations. 
Table 16 
Perceived Seriousness of the IBM PC Viruses Problem in the Organizations 
Seriousness of the problem 
No problem 
Only a minor problem 
A reasonable serious problem 
A major problem 
Number of 
Respondents 
15 
24 
2 
1 
42 
Percentage 
35.71 
57.14 
4.76 
2.38 
100.00 
5.3.2 Number of organizations that had IBM PC viruses infection 
There were a total of27 (64.29%) organizations reported to have at least one IBM 
PC virus infection over the years. The following table summarises the number of 
times the 27 organizations have had an IBM PC virus infection. It reveals that the 
majority of the organizations (55.56%) have between 1 and 4 infections over the 
years. 
In terms of number of separate incidents, the organizations have an average 
of 15 incidents with a S.D. of 39. However, it should be noted that there is an 
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organization which has a very large number of occurrences (200 times). If this 
organization were excluded from the calculation, the number of separate incidents 
of the organizations, on average, will be 8, with a S.D. of 10. These figures are 
believed to be more representative than the previous figures since it is rather 
unusual to have this large number of infections. 
Table 17 
Number of IBM PC Virus Infection in the Organizations 
Number of Number of Percentage Total 
Infections Respondents Infections 
1 4 14.81 4 
2 5 18.52 10 
3 2 7.41 6 
4 4 14.81 16 
5 1 3. 70 5 
6 2 7.41 12 
7 1 3. 70 7 
9 1 3. 70 9 
12 1 3. 70 12 
16 1 3. 70 16 
20 1 3. 70 20 
26 1 3. 70 26 
30 1 3. 70 30 
31 1 3. 70 31 
200 1 3. 70 200 
27 100.00 404 
Mean= 14.96 = 15 
Standard Deviation= 38.04 = 39 
5. 3. 3 Types of PC virus infections 
The number of incident of IBM PC viruses by types in the organizations in the 
periods prior to 1991, during 1991, and as of April 1992 is summarised in Table 
18. 
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Table 18 
Number of IBM PC Viruses by Types in the Organizations 
Types Prior to During As of Total 
199136 1991 April 1992 
No % No % No % No % 
New Zealand 83 20.54 99 24.50 7 1. 73 189 46.78 
(Stoned, 
Marijuana) 
Michelangelo 132 32.67 6 1. 4 9 138 34.16 
Liberty (Magic, 3 0.74 28 6.93 1 0.25 32 7.92 
Mystic) 
Jerusalem 2 0.50 5 1. 24 1 0.25 8 1. 98 
(Jerusalem B) 
Den Zuk (Search) 6 1. 4 9 6 1. 49 
Ohio (Hacker) 5 1. 24 5 1. 24 
Keypress (Turku, 3 0.74 1 0.25 4 0.99 
Twins) 
Dark Avenger 3 0.74 3 0.74 
Italian (Pingpong, 3 0.74 3 0.74 
Friday the 15th, 
Israel) 
No-Int37 2 0.50 1 0.25 3 0.74 
Flip 2 0.50 2 0.50 
1559 1 0.25 1 0.25 
1575 1 0.25 1 0.25 
Form 1 0.25 1 0.25 
Slow 1 0.25 1 0.25 
Unknown 1 0.25 6 1. 4 9 7 1. 73 
Total 89 22.03 295 73. 02 20 4.95 404 100.00 
36 The data from the survey show that the first incidents of IBM PC virus attacks among 
the respondents occurred in 1989. 
37 No-Int is a variant of New Zealand. 
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5.3.4 Number of PC infected during each infection in the organizations 
The number of IBM PC infected during each of the IBM PC Viruses infections in 
the organizations is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19 reveals that there were a total of 6490 PCs (including reinfection) 
infected as a result of the 404 incidents. On average, this gives rise to an average of 
16.06 PCs being infected in each of the incidents. However, it should be noted that 
there is an organization which has a very large number of occurrences (200 times), 
with 30 PCs infected during each of the 200 infections. If this organization were 
excluded from the calculation, there were a total of 460 PCs being infected in 204 
separate incidents, with an average of 2.25 PCs being infected per incident. These 
figures are believed to be more representative than the previous figures because the 
very large number of infections in the particular organization is really a unique case 
and should not be treated as the same with the other cases. 
Table 19 
Number of IBM PC Infected During Each Infection in the Organizations 
Number of PC Number of Percentage Total PC 
Infected Respondents Infected 
0 3 0.74 0 
1 127 31. 4 4 127 
2 50 12.38 100 
3 3 0.74 9 
4 2 0.50 8 
5 3 0.74 15 
6 1 0.25 6 
10 3 0.74 30 
13 10 2.48 130 
30 201 4 9. 7 5 6030 
35 1 0.25 35 
404 100.00 6490 
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5.3.5 Time taken for the eradication of each incident in the organiza.tions 
The following table summarises the time taken for each of the viruses to be cleaned 
or removed from PC. In 2 separate incidents, the viruses, contained in floppy disks, 
were detected before any PC was infected. Therefore, there was no need to 
eradicate the viruses from PC for these 2 incidents. 
Table 20 shows that more than 84% of the organizations took less than 10 
minutes to perform the clean-up procedures in the event of an IBM PC virus 
attack. However, in 5 separate incidents, the clean-up took between 1 and 3 days. 
Table 20 
Time Taken to Clean the Virus in Each Incident in the Organizations 
Time Taken Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
Not Applicable 2 0.50 
l - 10 minutes 340 84.16 
20 minutes 8 1. 98 
30 minutes 19 4.70 
1 - 2 hours 12 2.97 
2 - 3 hours 15 3.71 
3 - 5 hours 3 0.74 
1 1/2 day 2 0.50 
2 - 3 days 3 0.74 
404 100.00 
5.3. 6 Additional costs associated with each infection in the organizations 
Of the 27 organizations that have at least one encounter with an IBM PC viruses, 
only 2 (7.41 % ) reported to have additional costs associated with each clean-up of 
the infecting viruses. On one occasion, external contractor had to be asked to solve 
the problem, twice, which cost approximately a total of $300. In the other incident, 
hard disks drives had to be purchased as a result of the incident, which eventually 
cost the organization a total of $500. 
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5.3. 7 Major perpetrators classification 
Table 21 compares reported occurrences of IBM PC virus incidents according to 
the broad classifications of user staff, computer staff, external personnel, software 
vendor, and those unable to be identified 
The table indicates that approximately 80% of the perpetrations can be 
attributed to the user staff of the organizations with those unable to be identified 
make up the other 20% of the perpetrations. 
Table 21 
Person Responsible for Introducing the Virus to the Organizations 
Perpetrator Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
User staff 315 77. 97 
Computer staff 6 1. 49 
External personnel 2 0.50 
Software vendor 1 0.25 
Unknown 80 19.80 
404 100.00 
5.3.8 Actions taken as a result of each infection in the organiza,tions 
The following table summarises the action ( or actions) taken as a result of each of 
the IBM PC virus incidents in the organizations. Of particular note is that in the 
aftermath of 65.84% of the incidents no action whatsoever was taken by the 
victimised organizations. 
Table 22 
Actions Taken in Each of the Incidents in the Organizations 
Action Taken Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
None 266 65.84 
Formal Enquiry 2 0.50 
Informal Enquiry 45 11.14 
Educate User 91 22.52 
(Awareness Campaign) 
404 100.00 
62 
' 
'' 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
5.4 IBM PC Virus Controls 
This section is devoted to a review of the control mechanisms and procedures in 
relation to IBM PC viruses that are used in the organizations surveyed. 
5.4.1 Formal reporting and recording of IBM PC viruses procedures in 
the organizations 
In 17 (40.48%) of the 42 organizations formal reporting and recording of IBM PC 
viruses procedures are employed. Of those who do not keep a log of the incidents 
(n = 25), 44% (n = 11) cited IBM PC viruses, as a form of computer abuse, is a 
relatively minor problem in their organization and therefore, recording of the 
incidents is not necessary. Another 28% (n = 7) claimed that a log is unnecessary 
because they have never had any infection before. 
5.4.2 Formal IBM PC viruses clean-up procedures in the organizations 
In this paper, / ormal clean-up procedures is taken to mean that in the event of a 
virus attack, an organization has some means to eradicate the infecting viruses. 
Anti-viral software are usually used to perform the clean-up procedures. 
The survey has found that in 39 (92.86%) of the 42 organizations formal 
clean-up procedures of IBM PC viruses are employed. Of those who have no 
formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures, 100% (n = 3) cited because they 
have never had any encounter with any IBM PC viruses before, therefore the clean-
up procedures are not necessary. 
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5.4.3 Formal Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) Plan in the 
organiza.tions 
In 11 (26.19%) of the 42 organizations a formal Contingency plan in relation to 
IBM PC viruses is adopted to ensure minimal interruption to normal business 
operations to the organization's IBM PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack. 
5.4.4 Storing of back-up copies of original software in the organizations 
In 26 (92.86%) of the 28 organizations that have networking systems, there is a 
policy that prescribes storing back-up copies of original software for IBM PCs that 
are linked to the networks as soon as the package is open. However, only 4 
(14.29%) out of the 26 organizations store back-up copies of original software at 
the offsite location. In 39 (92.86%) of the 42 organizations, back-up copies of 
original software used in stand-alone IBM PCs are stored as soon as the package is 
open. However, only 8 (19.05%) out of the 39 organizations store the back-up 
copies at the off site location, as illustrated in Table 23. 
Table 23 
Storing of Back-up Copies of Original Software in the Organizations 
Back-up No Back-up Total 
Onsite Offsite 
No % No % No % No % 
Software In 22 78. 57 4 14.29 2 7.14 28 100 
Networked PCs 
Software In 31 73.81 8 19.05 3 7.14 42 100 
Stand-alone PCs 
5.4.5 Creating of back-up copies of all applications and data in the 
organiza.tions 
In all ( 100%, n = 28) organizations that have networking systems, there is a policy 
that prescribes creating back-up copies of all applications and associated data for 
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IBM PCs that are linked to the networks on a regular basis. Seventeen ( 60. 71 % ) of 
the 28 organizations create back-ups on a daily basis; two (7.14%) create back-ups 
once a week; and nine (32.14%) do not have a fixed date to create back-ups. 
For stand-alone IBM PCs, a policy that prescribes creating back-up copies 
of all applications and data are found in only 3 (7.14%) out of the 42 
organizations. In other words, in 92.86% of organizations, the onus is on the users 
of the stand-alone PCs to create their own back-up regularly. This is 
understandable because it is generally not economically feasible to perform back-up 
on behalf of all of the users of stand-alone PCs within an organization. 
Table 24 
Creating of Back-up Copies of All Applications and Data in the Organizations 
Creating Back-up No Back-up Total 
No % No % No % 
Software In Networked PCs 28 100.00 0 0.00 28 100.00 
Software In Stand-alone PCs 3 7.14 39 92.86 42 100.00 
5.4. 6 Testing of back-up and recovery procedures in the organizations 
There is a policy that prescribes testing standard procedures for back-up and 
recoveries for IBM PCs that are linked to the networks in 21 (75%) of the 28 
organizations that have networking systems. However, for stand-alone IBM PCs, a 
policy that prescribes testing standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for 
IBM PCs is found in only 4 (9.52%) out of the 42 organizations. Table 25 depicts 
the frequency with which the organizations carry out the testing of the back-up and 
recovery procedures. Table 26 depicts the last time with which the organizations 
test the back-up and recovery procedures. 
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Table 25 
Frequency with Which the Organizations Carry Out the 
Testing of the Back-up and Recovery Procedures 
Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
When Changes Are 14 56.00 
Introduced 
Daily 1 4.00 
Once A Week 2 8.00 
Once a Month 2 8.00 
Twice A Year 3 12.00 
Once a Year 3 12.00 
25 100.00 
Table 26 
The Last Time the Testing of the Back-up and Recovery 
Procedures was Carried Out in the Organizations 
Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
Within The Last Two Weeks 4 16.00 
Four Weeks Ago 3 12.00 
Two Months Ago 3 12.00 
Six Months Ago 7 28.00 
Nine Months Ago 1 4.00 
One Year Ago 6 24.00 
Two Years Ago 1 4.00 
25 100.00 
5.4. 7 Assigning personnel to specific responsibilities regarding back-up 
procedures in the organizations 
In 24 (85.71%) of the 28 organizations that have networking systems, personnel is 
assigned to specific responsibilities regarding back-up procedures for IBM PCs 
that are linked to the networks. However, all 42 organizations (100%) do not see a 
need to assign personnel to specific responsibilities regarding back-up procedures 
for all stand-alone IBM PCs, as shown in Table 27. 
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Table 27 
Assigning Personnel to Specific Responsibilities Regarding 
Back-up Procedures in the Organizations 
Assign Personnel No Personnel Assigned Total 
No % No % No % 
Software In 24 85.71 4 14.29 28 100 
Networked PCs 
Software In 0 0.00 32 100.00 32 100 
Stand-alone PCs 
5.4. 8 Antiviral software used in the organizations 
In 37 (88.10%) of the organizations, at least one antiviral software package or 
system is used to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to the 
organization's IBM PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack. The number of 
antiviral software used in the organizations is set out in Table 28. The types of the 
individual antiviral software used in the organizations is listed in Table 29. 
Table 28 
Number of Antiviral Software Used in the Organizations 
Number of Antiviral Number of Percentage Total Number of 
Software Used Respondents A. Software 
1 27 72.97 27 
2 8 21.62 16 
3 1 2. 70 3 
4 1 2.70 4 
37 100.00 50 
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Table 29 
Antiviral Software Used in the Organizations 
Antiviral 
Software 
Scan 
Virus Buster 
Number of 
Respondents 
Doctor Solomon's Toolkit 
Norton AntiVirus 
22 
6 
5 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
IBM Virus Scan 
Virucide 
Central Point Software 
F Prot 
Flu Shot Plus 
Victor Charlie 
ViruSafe 
Virustop 
Virusfix 
50 
Percentage 
44.00 
12.00 
10.00 
10.00 
6.00 
4.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
100.00 
5.4.9 Software acquisition policy in the organiza,tions 
In 35 (83.33%) of organizations, a Software Acquisition policy is maintained to 
control and inspect all software brought into the organization's IBM PCs. For 
those who have a Software Acquisition policy (n = 35): 
• 97.14% (n = 34) of respondents prescribe purchasing software only from 
reputable vendors and accepting only software received in original sealed 
packaging; 
• 74.29% (n = 26) of respondents prescribe reviewing, inspecting and testing 
new software as well as upgrades to existing software before installation; 
and 
• 74.29% (n = 26) of respondents accept shareware or freeware into their 
organizations' IBM PCs. Twenty four (92.31%) of the 26 organizations 
that accept shareware or freeware into their organizations' IBM PCs will 
test any shareware or freeware prior to use in production. 
68 
t 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Chapter Six 
Discussion of the Survey 
6.1 Organization Profiles 
The data in Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate the sizes of the organizations included in the 
survey. The organizations surveyed are generally large, with over 52% of them 
having between 51 and 300 staff and approximately 90% of them having a 
computing ( or computer services or IT) section. However, these sections are, in 
general, small with 58% of them having less than 10 staff. 
6.2 Profile of the IBM PC Use 
6.2.1 IBM PC 
The data in Table 7 confirms the view that IBM PCs are in wide spread use with 
approximately 12% of those surveyed having more than 500 IBM PCs in their 
organization and that on average, the number of IBM PCs each organization owns 
is 170. 
The data in Table 9 suggests that there is almost a one for one 
correspondence between the number of IBM PCs and the number of IBM PC 
users. This is significant from a computer virus research perspective because it 
implies that there is unlikely to be a large population using the one machine or 
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several machines and sharing disks. Thus, the likelihood of transmitting viruses 
through sharing disks may be reduced. 
The data in Table 11 show that the organizations surveyed are experienced 
with more than 71 % of them having over 6 years of experience with IBM PC ( and 
clones) environment, given that IBM PC (and clones) has been available in 
Australia for approximately a decade. Again this is significant from a computer 
virus research perspective as experienced users are more likely to be aware of the 
problems and transfer mechanisms associated with computer viruses. 
6.2.2 Apple Macintosh 
Although this survey was not examining computer viruses associated with Apple 
Macintosh PCs, data was gathered on these PCs because it was considered 
worthwhile to establish the penetration of these systems into the PC market in the 
State Government sector to consider whether research into Apple Macintosh 
viruses could be justified. If these Macintosh systems represented a significantly 
high proportion of investment then more attention could be devoted to addressing 
virus problems in this environment. 
As it transpired, the data in Table 8 show that approximately 80% of the 
organizations surveyed had less than 15 Macintoshs and 43% had none at all. In 
fact, Table 10 shows that 75% of the organizations had less than 10 staff who 
regularly used Macintosh computers. These data suggest that the most common 
businness PC in use in this sector was the IBM style machine. This area would then 
be most likely to be require more attention for support in virus research. 
6.2.3 Network connections 
The transfer of computer viruses across networks has been seen as a major threat 
and the data in Tables 12 show that the use of IBM PC style networks is 
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reasonably common with two third of the organisations surveyed having at least 
one newtork of this type. Table 13 shows that 15% of these networks have more 
than 50 PCs linked to them. 
The types of network operating system (NOS) environments are listed in 
Table 14 and the implications for virus security differs in each case. Table 14 
shows that the two most popular NOSs are Novell's NetWare and 3COM's 3+ 
Open. This is in accordance with Christianson, King, & Munger's (1990, p. 6) 
claim that "the most popular NOS is NetWare, ... which has an estimated 65% of 
market share" and that "3+ Open ... is probably the second most popular system, 
with about a 10-15% market share." 
The data in Table 15 show that in two third of the cases, if the network in 
use in the organizations were put out of action, it would have major effects on 
company operation. This suggests that organizations have increasingly come to 
reply on the use of network systems and that the non-availability of these systems 
would have far reaching consequences to the affected organizations. Therefore, 
from the standpoint of computer virus reseach, network security is a worth-while 
effort. 
6.2.4 External connections 
It is also argued that the use of dial-in/out connections has the potential to transfer 
viruses in much the same way as a network but is even more dangerous in that 
external intrusion may occur. In only 3 5% of the organizations surveyed was 
external dial-in capability allowed. However, only 26% of these organizations use a 
dial-back system to allow only access from an approved list of numbers. Most of 
the 11 organizations that do not use the dial back system are relying on stand-alone 
systems and the password mechanism to prevent unauthorised access. 
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6.3 IBM PC Virus Problem Experience 
6.3.1 Perceived seriousness 
With regard to the perceived seriousness of computer virus infections, Table 16 
shows that more than one third (3 5%) of the respondents did not see any problem. 
Another 58% claim it was only a minor problem. In fact only 7% of the 
respondents regard computer virus infections as reasonably serious or as a major 
problem. 
This is a surprising result and may reflect the mechanisms and procedures 
which have been established effectively to prevent computer viruses becoming a 
problem. For example, Table 28 shows that more than 88% of the organizations 
have at least one antiviral software and that more than 84% of the organizations 
(from Table 20) claimed that it took them less than 10 minutes to perform the 
clean-up procedures in the event of an IBM PC virus attack. 
It may even be that the use of anti-viral software has lulled users into a false 
sense of security thinking they are "protected" against viruses (Zajac, 1992, p. 
225). However, it should be noted that anti-viral software is not a panacea because 
it will not protect against all viruses but only the known ones. Furthermore, it is 
possible that even with an anti-viral program in place, an organization could still be 
a victim of an attack because the virus had a new twist to beat the anti-viral 
software. To quote Zajac (1992, p. 225), "anti-viral software is only a treatment, 
not a cure or vaccine to the viral problem." 
6.3.2 Infection type 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate and quantify the infection types 
and rates of IBM PC viruses in the Western Australian State Government 
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organizations. Table 18 shows that there were a total of 15 unique IBM PC viruses 
that were known to infect the responding organizations. 
The following table shows the types of each of the 15 unique IBM PC 
viruses that are known to have infected the responding organizations, and the 
damage done by these viruses. As mentioned, this classification method is based on 
the one used by VIRUSCAN Version 8.4B89 (1992). 
Table 30 
Infection Types of the 15 Known IBM PC Viruses in the 
Organizations and the Damage Done by These Viruses 
Name of Virus 
1559 
1575 
Dark Avenger 
Den Zuk 
(Search) 
Flip 
Form 
Italian 
(Pingpong, Friday the 15th, Israel) 
Jerusalem 
(Jerusalem Bl 
Keypress 
(Turku, Twins) 
Liberty 
(Magic, Mystic) 
Michelangelo 
New Zealand 
(Stoned, Marijuana) 
No-Int 
(New Zealand, Stoned, Marijuana) 
Ohio 
(Hacker) 
Slow 
* Type Codes 
1 = Virus uses Stealth Techniques 
2 = Virus uses self-encryption 
3 Virus install self in memory 
4 Infects COMMAND. COM 
5 Infects COM files 
6 Infects EXE files 
7 = Infects overlay files 
8 Infects floppy diskette boot 
9 Infects fixed disk boot sector 
* Type 
2,3,4,5,6 
3,4,5,6 
3,4,5,6,7 
3,8 
2,3,4,5,6,7 
3,8,9 
3,8,9 
3,5,6,7 
3,4,5,6 
3,4,5,6,7 
3, 8, 9,A 
3, 8,A 
3,8,A 
3,8 
2,3,5,6,7 
A= Infects fixed disk partition table 
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Damage 
O,P,L 
O,P,L 
O,P,L 
O,B 
O,P,D,L 
8,0,D 
O,B 
O,P 
O,P,D 
O,P 
8,0 
0,8,L 
O,B,L 
8,0 
O,P,L 
Done ** 
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** Damage Fields 
B = Corrupts or overwrites the boot sector 
D = Corrupts data files 
F = Formats or overwrites all/part of disk 
L = Directly or indirectly corrupts file linkage 
0 = Affects system run-time operation 
P = Corrupts program or overlay files 
From Table 30, it is apparent that of the 15 known viruses that are known to have 
infected the respondents: 
• none (0%) of them uses Stealth techniques; 
• 3 (20%) of them use self-encryption techniques; 
• all 15 (100%) of them are memory-resident after infection; 
• 6 ( 40%) of them infect COMMAND. COM file; 
• 8 (53.33%) of them infect COM files; 
• 8 (53.33%) of them infect EXE files; 
• 5 (33.33%) of them infect overlay files; 
• 7 (46.67%) of them infect floppy diskette boot; 
• 3 (20%) of them infect fixed disk boot sector; and 
• 3 (20%) of them infect fixed disk partition table (aka master boot 
record). 
Table 30 also shows that of the 15 known viruses that are known to have infected 
the respondents: 
• all 15 (100%) of them affect system run-time operation; 
• 8 (53.33%) of them corrupt program or overlay files; 
• 7 (46.67%) of them directly or indirectly corrupt file linkage 
• 7 (46.67%) of them corrupt or overwrite the boot sector; 
• 3 (20%) of them corrupt data files; and 
• none (0%) of them formats or overwrites all or part of disk. 
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6.3.3 Reinfection rate 
In this paper, reinfection is taken to mean that a particular computer virus reinfects 
an organization's PC (or PCs) after the first infection of the same virus has been 
eradicated. 
Reinfection occurred in 18 (66.67%) of the 27 organizations that had at 
least one encounter with an IBM PC virus over the years. Table 31 shows the 
number of times the reinfection of the viruses in the organizations had occurred. 
From Table 31, it is evident that over 4 7% of the time reinfection 1s 
occurred only once and that there were a total of 333 reinfections out of a total of 
404 separate incidents, which makes the reinfection rate stands at 82.43%. 
Table 31 
Number of Reinfections of Viruses in the Organizations 
Number of Times Number of Percentage Total Number of 
Reinfected Respondents Reinfections 
1 16 47.06 16 
2 1 2.94 2 
4 4 11. 76 16 
5 2 5.88 10 
7 1 2. 94 7 
9 2 5.88 18 
11 1 2. 94 11 
14 3 8.82 42 
19 1 2.94 19 
26 1 2.94 26 
67 1 2. 94 67 
99 1 2.94 99 
34 100.00 333 
6.3.4 Spafford's (1990) speculation 
The data in Table 18 show that 4 IBM PC viruses (i.e., New Zealand, 
Michelangelo, Liberty, and Jerusalem) account for 367 out of the 404 incidents 
in the responding organizations, or an equivalent of90.84% of all infections. 
75 
' 
J: 
t 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Thus, Spafford's speculation that less than 10 viruses account for 90% of 
all infections holds true in the Western Australian State Government organizations 
environment. 
6.3.5 Comparison with the 1991 Dataquest survey 
A comparison of the known infecting viruses with Dataquest's 1991 Computer 
Virus Market Survey is tabulated in Table 32. 
Table 32 
A Western Australia - U.S. Computer Viruses by Types Comparison of Infections 
Computer United States Western Australia 
Virus 
New Zealand 48% 4 6. 7 8% 
Jerusalem 37% 1. 98% 
Joshi 8% 
Michelangelo 34.16% 
Liberty 7.92% 
93% 90.84% 
The most striking aspect of Table 32 is that Spafford's (1990) speculation that less 
than 10 viruses account for 90% of infections holds true for both surveys. 
Dataquest's survey reveals that 63% of respondents reported at least one 
encounter with a virus in 1991 whereas the present study's survey shows that 
64.29% of the responding organizations reported at least one IBM PC vtrus 
infection over the years. 
6. 3. 6 Major perpetrators classification 
The data from Table 21 indicates that the user staff of the organizations account 
for approximately 80% of the perpetrations with those unable to be identified 
nearly make up the other 20% of the perpetrations. Clearly, this is an area where 
effective control can be applied. The user staff of the organizations have to be 
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educated to be aware of the viruses problem, and means by which viruses can be 
transmitted. By doing so, the threat of the viruses may be reduced since 
collectively, the user staff of the organizations account for 8 out of 10 
perpetrations. 
6.4 IBM PC Vims Controls 
Prior to the commencement of this study it had been assumed that there would be 
difficulty in both detecting whether particular problems had been caused by viruses 
and secondly if a particular problem had been encountered had the virus been 
identified. As it transpired, the interview situation in which the questionnaire was 
administered provided an indication that the anticipated virus identification 
problems did not arise in that the organizations surveyed appeared to be well 
informed and have the tools to identify viruses infecting them. Of all the viruses 
detected only seven incidents (1.73%) could not be identified positively. 
A close examination of the data showed that the control mechanisms and 
procedures of the organizations surveyed, in general, are adequate. For example: 
• formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures are in place in over 92% of 
the organizations; 
• over 92% of the organizations prescibe storing, mostly onsite, back-up 
copies of original software that are used in both networked and stand-alone 
PCs;38 
• all organizations (100%) prescribe creating back-up copies of all 
applications and associated data for networked PCs on a regular basis; 
38 This is to allow restoration of a system that has been contaminated by a time-released 
virus. 
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• the standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for the networked IBM 
PCs are tested and reviewed regularly in 75% of the organizations that have 
networking system; 
• personnel are assigned specific responsibilities regarding back-up 
procedures in over 85% of the organizations that have networking systems; 
• over 88% of the organizations use at least one anti-viral software package 
to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to their IBM 
PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack; 
• a Software Acquisition policy is maintained m over 83% of the 
organizations to control and inspect all software brought into their IBM 
PCs; and 
• no fewer than 74% of the organizations that have the Software Acquisition 
policy realise the importance of 
purchasing software only from reputable vendor and accepting only 
software received in original sealed packaging; 
reviewing, inspecting and testing new software as well as upgrades 
to existing software before installation; and 
testing any shareware, freeware in quarantine (e.g., test or 
development machine or stand-alone PCs) prior to use m 
production. 
Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the virus control mechanisms and procedures in 
the organizations that are found to be inadequate: only approximately 40% of the 
organizations keep a formal reporting and recording of the virus incidents in their 
organizations; and a Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) plan in relation to IBM PC 
viruses are in place in only 26% of the organizations. 
To effectively control the virus problem, the importance of having a 
Contingency plan and keeping a log of all virus incidents cannot be stressed enough. 
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Given that the organizations surveyed are, in general, large with many staff ( as shown 
in Tables 4, 5, and 6) and that the user organizations are experienced with more than 
70% having more than 5 years experience with the IBM PC ( and compatibles) 
environment, one would assume that these two aspects of virus controls would not be 
overlooked. One clue to this phenomenon may be that over 92% of the respondents 
regard computer virus infections as a relatively minor problem. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the reasons, these two aspects of virus controls are very important and 
should receive increased consideration. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of the Survey Findings 
The major findings from an analysis of this survey are that: 
• With regard to the perceived seriousness of computer virus infections, over 
92% of the respondents regard computer virus infections as a relatively minor 
problem. 
• 64.29% of respondents reported at least one encounter with an IBM PC 
• 
virus during the period from 1989 to April 1992; 
Over 55% of the organizations surveyed have between 1 and 4 infections 
during the period from 1989 to April 1992; the average number of incidents 
per organization is 8; 
• With the exception of one organization, 2.25 PCs, on average, were 
infected in each incidents, which is negligible when compared to an average 
of 170 PCs each organization owns; 
• New Zealand (or Stoned or Marijuana) was responsible for 46.78% of 
all attacks, Michelangelo for 34.16%, Liberty (or Mystic or Magic) for 
7.92% and Jerusalem (or Jerusalem B) for 1.98%; together these 4 
viruses account for over 90% of all infections; 
• Over 84% of respondents reported that the clean-up procedures of the 
infecting viruses took less than 10 minutes; 
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• Apart from interruption of business operations and loss of productivity, 
additional costs associated with each clean-up of the infecting viruses is 
reported in approximately 7% of cases; 
• In 78% of cases, the infecting viruses were introduced by the user staff of 
the organizations; 
• No action ( other than clean-up) was taken in the aftermath of 66% of the 
incidents; 
• Over 59% of the organizations do not have a formal reporting and 
recording of viruses procedures; 
• Formal clean-up of IBM PC viruses procedures are in place in over 92% of 
the organizations; 
• Over 73% of the organizations do not have a formal Contingency (or 
disaster recovery) plan in relation to computer viruses; 
• Over 92% of the organizations prescibe storing, mostly onsite, back-up 
copies of original software that are used in both networked and stand-alone 
PCs; 
• All organizations (100%) prescribe creating back-up copies of all 
applications and associated data for networked PCs on a regular basis; 
• The standard procedures for back-up and recoveries for the networked 
IBM PCs are tested and reviewed regularly in 75% of the organizations 
that have networking system; 
• Personnel are assigned specific responsibilities regarding back-up 
procedures in over 85% of the organizations that have networking systems; 
• Over 88% of the organizations use at least one anti-viral software package 
to ensure minimal interruption to normal business operations to their IBM 
PCs in the event of an IBM PC virus attack; and 
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• A Software Acquisition policy is maintained in over 83% of the 
organizations to control and inspect all software brought into their IBM 
PCs. 
7.2 Future Research Directions 
7.2.1 Comparison study with other states and sectors 
The present study was designed to investigate the State Government IT sector of 
W estem Australia. Clearly this study was based on assumptions of homogeneity 
across Australia and other sectors which may not hold. Some future comparison 
study with other states and sectors would be a fruitful area for further research to 
test this assumption. 
7.2.2 Follow up study 
A follow up study to examine trends in frequency and type of virus is worthy of 
some future study as it is expected further viruses of the current types in addition 
to new types will become manifest for some time yet. 
7.2.3 Detailed analysis 
A detailed analysis of the relationships between the number and type of computer 
viruses and other factors (e.g., size of organization, size of network) to examine 
whether a different scale of operation and infrastructure may affect outcomes in 
this field is another area worthy of some further study. 
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7.2.4 Taxonomy of viruses by types 
As mentioned in section 1.4, there is general disagreement among researchers 
regarding the classification of the various viruses by types and this debate is likely 
to continue. Nevertheless, perhaps clarification could be achieved in the concepts 
of "generic viruses" which could be categorised in a taxonomy. This would be a 
fruitful area for further research although the changing nature of viruses must leave 
this open to continual adjustment. 
7.2.5 Universal Virus Detector (UVD) 
A UVD is a program which can perform static or dynamic analysis of programs 
and determine with 100% certainty whether the programs contain a virus or not. 
The most difficult task would be for the UVD to determine when a virus infection 
had actually occurred. This is partially because of the lack of a precise definition of 
the term "virus". One solution is to develop "generic viruses" which will be of great 
help in developing a generic virus defence or collection of generic strategies. 
7.2. 6 Stealth Viruses Detection 
Another area worthy of further research is to propose mechanisms and techniques 
for the detection of the so-called "Stealth" viruses. This area is rather specific in 
that the research will only concentrate on the detection methods of one of many 
types of viruses. This area also represents specific leading area research in the 
computer virus field. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
This paper presents the results of an extensive survey undertaken in a number of 
government based user environments in Western Australia. The study has 
accomplished several objectives: 
• It provides factual information regarding the nature and prevalence of the 
virus infections in the Western Australian environment, in particular, the 
infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in the W.A. State Government 
sector; 
• It sets a base line of viruses information for government organizations in 
W.A. and provides a comparison with overseas findings; 
• 
• 
• 
It provides current evidence that there is a problem m the work 
environment in W.A. as opposed to the creation and isolation of computer 
viruses in laboratories of computer science; 
It identifies what other people are doing with similar problems or situations 
and benefit from their experience in making future plans and decisions; 
It ratifies the propositions that currently very few of the viruses contribute 
to the vast majority of infections in the Western Australian workplace. 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
(adapted from "Known IBM", 1991) 
Name Aliases 
8 Tunes 
10-past-3 
268-Plus 
432 
483 
535A 
555 Dutch 555 
777 Revenge 
800 
905 
928 
1024PrScr 
1028 
1067 
1077 
1226 
1260 V2Pl 
1575 
1600 
2100 
2144 
2480 
3445 
5120 
4K 4096, Frodo, IDF, Israeli Defence Forces 
Advent 
Aircop 
Agiplan 
AIDS 
AIDS II 
Akuku 
Alabama 
Ambulance RedX 
Amoeba 
Amstrad 
Amstrad-852 
Amstrad-877 
Anthrax 
AntiCAD Plastique 
AntiCAD 2576 
AntiCAD/Plastique 3004 
* Type Codes 
C = Infects COM files 
D = Infects DOS boot sector (Logical Sector O on disk) 
E = Infects EXE files 
Type* 
CER 
CR 
CN 
C? 
CER 
CN 
CER 
CR 
CR 
ER 
CER 
CR 
CER 
CR 
CER 
CR 
CN 
CER 
CER 
CER 
CER 
CR 
CER 
CEN 
CER 
CEN 
DR 
CR 
CN 
PN 
CER 
ER 
CN 
CER 
CN 
CN 
CN 
MCER 
CER 
CER 
CER 
M = Infects master boot sector (Track O, Head O, Sector 1 on 
disk) 
N = Not memory-resident after infection 
P = Companion virus 
R = Memory-resident after infection 
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Name 
Anti-Pascal (1) 
Anti-Pascal (2) 
Apocalypse 
Apocalypse II 
Arf 
Armagedon 
Attention 
Australian 403 
Azusa 
Backtime 
Bad Boy 
Bandit 
Bebe 
Best Wishes 
Big Joke 
Black Monday 
Bijec 
Blood 
Beijing 
Boys 
Brain 
Burger 
Burger 382 
Burger405 
CARA 
Carioca 
Cascade 
Cascade YAP 
Casino 
Casper 
Cemetery 
Christmas in Japan 
Christmas Tree 
Christmas Violator 
Cinderella 
Cookie 
Crazy Eddie 
Damage 
Dark Avenger 
Darklord 
Darth Vader 
Datacrime 
Datacrime II 
Datalock 
dBASE 
DBFBlank 
December 24th 
Deicide 
Demon 
DenZuk 
LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Aliases 
Bloody! 
Ashar, Shoe 
Fall, Russian, Hailstorm 
Father Christmas, Choinka 
Search 
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Type 
CN 
CN 
CER 
CER 
CN 
CR 
CR 
CR 
DR 
CR 
CR 
EN 
CN 
CR 
CN 
CER 
CN 
CN 
MR 
CN 
DR· 
CN 
CN 
CN 
CR 
CR 
CR 
CR 
CR 
CN 
ER 
CN 
CN 
CN 
CR 
CER 
CER 
CER 
CER 
CER 
CR 
CN 
CEN 
CER 
CR 
CER 
ER 
CN 
CN 
DR 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Name Aliases Type 
Destructor CER 
Devil's Dance CR 
Diabolik CER 
Diamond 1024 CER 
Diamond-1173 David CER 
Dir CR 
Discom CR 
Diskjeb CER 
Disk Killer Ogre DR 
Do-nothing CR 
Doom2 CER 
Doomll-B CER 
Dot Killer CN 
Durban Saturday 14th CER 
Dyslexia Solano CR 
Eddie-2 651 CER 
Eddie-1801 CER 
E.D.V. DR 
Enigma ER 
Erasmus CER 
ETC CN 
Evil CR 
Evil Empire MR 
Evil Empire B MR 
Faust Spyer CER 
Fellowship ER 
Fichv 2.1 CN 
Filler DR 
Finger CER 
Fish 6 CER 
Flash CER 
Flip MCER 
Form DR 
Formiche CR 
Frog's Alley CR 
Fu Manchu CER 
F-word USSR-417 CR 
Gergana CN 
GhostBalls CN 
Goblin CER 
GPl CER 
Gremlin CER 
Grither CN 
Guppy CR 
Hallochen CER 
Hero CER 
mv CER 
Horse Hacker, Black horse CER 
Horse group CER 
Hybrid CN 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Name Aliases Type 
Hymn CER 
Icelandic Saratoga ER 
INT13 CR 
Internal EN 
Iraqui Warrior CN 
Italian Pingpong, Bouncing Ball, Vera Cruz DR 
Itavir EN 
Jeff CN 
Jerusalem PLO, Friday the 13th, Israeli CER 
Jo-Jo CR 
Jocker 
Joker-01 CR 
Joshi MR 
July 13th ER 
Justice CR 
Kamikaze EN 
Kemerovo CN 
Kennedy CN 
Keypress Turku, Twins CER 
Keypress-1228 CER 
Kiev CR 
Klaeren CER 
Korea NJH DR 
Kylie CER 
Lehigh CR 
Leprosy CN 
Leprosy-B CER 
Leszop DR 
Liberty Magic, Mystic DCER 
Little Pieces ER 
Lozinsky CR 
LoveChild CN 
Lucifer CER 
Macho CEN 
Magnitogorsk 2560 CER 
Mardi Bros DR 
MG CR 
MG-3 CR 
MG-4 CR 
MGTU CN 
Micro-128 CR 
Microbes DR 
Migram-1 ER 
Migram-2 ER 
Minimal-30 CN 
Minimal-45 CN 
MIR CER 
Mirror ER 
Mistake Typoboot DR 
MIXl ER 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Name Aliases Type 
MIX2 CER. 
MLTI CR 
Monxla Time CN 
Monxla-B CN 
Murphy CER. 
Murphy-3 CER. 
Murphy-4 CER 
Music Bug DR 
Mutant CN 
New Zealand Stoned, Marijuana MR 
Nina CR 
No Bock 440 CN 
Nomenldatura CER 
NTKC C-23693 CN 
NumberOne CN 
Number of the Beast 666, V512 CR 
Ohio Hacker DR 
Old Yankee EN 
Ontario CER. 
Oropax Music virus CR 
Paris TCC CEN 
Parity CN 
PcVrsDs CER 
Pentagon DR 
Perfume CR 
Perfume-731 CR 
Pest CER. 
Phantom CR 
Phenome CER. 
Phoenix Pl CR 
Piter Polish 529 CR 
Pixel CN 
Pixel-257,275,295,283 CN 
Pixel-892 CN 
Pixel-779,837,850,854 CN 
Pixel-936 CN 
Plague CR 
Plastique 521 C? 
Polimer CN 
Polish 217 CR 
Pretoria June 16th CN 
PrintScreen DR 
Protecto C? 
Proud CR 
Prudents EN 
PSQR 
Rat ER 
Raubkopi Raub CR 
Russian Mirror CR 
Saddam CR 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Name Aliases Type 
Scott's Valley CER 
Sentinel CR 
September 18th CEN 
Sex Revolution MR 
Shake CR 
Simulation CN 
Skism CER 
Slow CER 
Smack Patricia CER 
South African Miami, Munich, Virus-B CN 
South African 408 CN 
South African 416 CN 
Spanish Telecom MCER 
Sparse CR 
Staf CN 
Striker 1 CN 
Subliminal CR 
Sunday CER 
Suomi CN 
Suriv 1.01 April 1st COM CR 
Suriv 2.01 April 1st EXE ER 
Suriv 3.00 Israeli CER 
SVC CER 
SVC 3.1 CER 
Sverdlov CER 
Svir EN 
Swami Guru, Bhaktivedanta CER 
Swap DR 
Swedish disaster MR 
Swiss-143 CN 
Sylvia CN 
Sylvia-2 SylviaB CN 
Syslock CEN 
Taiwan CN 
Taiwan-C CN 
Taiwan-D CN 
Tenbyte Valert CER 
Tequila EMR 
Terror CER 
Testvirus B CN 
Tiny CN 
Tiny Family CR 
TPworm PN 
Traceback Spanish CER 
Trackswap DR 
Trilogy ? 
Tumen CR 
TUQ RPVS CN 
Turbo448 CR 
TurboKukac CR 
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Known IBM PC computer viruses (as of July 1991) 
[continue] 
Name Aliases Type 
Typo Typo COM, Fumble CR 
USSR-311 V-311 CN 
USSR-492 492 CR 
USSR-516 516, Leapfrog CR 
USSR-600 600 CR 
USSR-696 696 CN 
USSR-707 707 CR 
USSR-711 711 CR 
USSR-948 948 CER 
USSR-1049 1049 CER 
USSR-1594 EN 
USSR-2144 CER 
V-1 OCR 
V2P2 CN 
V2P6 CN 
Vacsina CER 
Vcomm ER 
vcs 1.0 CN 
VFSI CN 
Victor CEN 
Vienna Austrian, Unesco, DOS62, Lisbon CN 
Vienna-622 CN 
Vienna-644 CN 
Vienna-645 CN 
Vienna-822 CN 
Violator CN 
Virdem CN 
Virdem-792 CN 
Virus-90 CN 
Virus-IOI CN 
Virus-B CN 
Voronezh CER 
VP CN 
Vriest CN 
Wl3 CN 
Warrior EN 
Westwood CER 
Whale CER 
Wisconsin Death to Pascal CR 
Wolfman CER 
WWT CN 
XAI CN 
Yale Alameda, Merritt DR 
Yankee CER 
Yaunch Wench EN 
Yukon CN 
Zeleng CER 
Zero Bug Palette CR 
Zero Hunt Minnow CR 
ZK-900 CER 
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire for the Survey 
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Edith Cowan University 
School of Information Technology and Mathematics 
An Investigation of IBM PC Computer Viruses Infection Rates 
and Types in A Western Australian Environment 
Subject No. _ 
A. Organization Profiles 
l. To help estimate the approximate size of your organization, could you estimate the gross 
actual budget for the current financial year? 
$ Million dollars 
2. Approximately how many staff are employed in the whole organization? 
__ people 
3. Does your organization have a separate computing/computer services department? 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(a) How many staff (e.g., Operators, Programmers, Analysts, Management, 
Engineering Support, Vendor staff permanently on site, Consultant 
permanently on site) are there in the computing centre? 
__ people 
B. Profile of the IBM PC Use 
4. How many IBM PCs (including IBM XT, AT, PS/2 and compatibles) are there currently 
in the whole organization? 
5. How many Apple Macintoshs are there currently in the whole organization? 
6. How many staff are IBM PC users in the whole organization? 
__ people 
7. How many staff are Macintosh users in the whole organization? 
__ people 
8. When did your organization obtain its first IBM PC? 
__ months/years 
9. Are any of the __ IBM PCs in the whole organization networked? 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
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(a) For each network, 
(i) How many IBM PCs are linked to this network in your organization? 
(ii) What is the Network Operating System for this network? 
(iii) If this network was put out of action, this would have 
( ) Minimal effect on company operation 
( ) Inconvenience effect on company operation 
( ) Major effect on company operation 
(b) Does your organization have Access Control Procedures that can be used for 
controlling and ljmiting all unauthorised access into its IBM PCs? 
()Yes 
()No 
lfYES: 
(a) Does the procedures prescribe 
(i) Instructing users never to leave a terminal unattended while 
logged on? 
()Yes 
()No 
(ii) Instituting such sound password standards as: 
. not using common passwords that are easy to guess 
. disabling vendor-supplied accounts and passwords 
. changing passwords regularly 
()Yes 
()No 
10. Are external dial-in capabilities allowed in your organization? 
() Yes 
()No 
lfYES: 
(a) Does your organization use a dial-back system to allow only access from an 
approved list of numbers? 
() Yes 
()No 
C. IBM PC Virus Problem Experience 
11. How serious is the viruses problem in your organization's IBM PCs? 
() No problem 
( ) Only a minor problem 
( ) A reasonable serious problem 
( ) A major problem 
12. Has your organization had any IBM PC virus infection before? 
()Yes 
()No 
lfYES: 
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(a) How many times has your organization had an IBM PC virus infection 
(including reinfection)? 
times 
(b) For each infection, 
(i) When did it occur? 
----(DD/MM/YY) 
(ii) Do you know the type of the infecting virus? 
()Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(i) What was the type of the virus? 
IfNO: 
(i) Can you describe the symptoms of the virus? 
(iii) Did you know how many IBM PCs were infected in the process? 
() Yes 
(iv) 
(v) 
()No 
IfYES: 
(1) How many PCs are infected in each infection? 
___ PC(s) 
How long did it take for the virus to be cleared? 
___ . days/weeks 
Were there additional costs associated with each clean-up? 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(1) What was the approximate cost of the clean-up? 
$ dollars 
(vi) Did you identify the person or persons (or the mechanism) responsible 
for introducing the virus? 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(l) Could you identify if it was perpetrated or assisted by a/an: 
( ) User staff 
( ) Computer staff 
() External person (e.g., Consultant, computer service 
personnel) 
() Unknown 
() Other (Please describe) 
(vii) What action was taken as a result of this incident? 
() None 
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( ) Fonnal inquiry 
( ) Infonnal enquiry 
() Other (Please specify) 
D. IBM PC Virus Control 
13. Does your organization have any fonnal reporting and recording of IBM PC computer 
viruses procedures? 
()Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(a) What are they? (Please describe briefly) 
14. Does your organization have fonnal IBM PC viruses clean-up procedures? (i.e., Does 
your organization assign any person responsible for the expeditious removal of 
contaminated software and the recovery and restoration of destroyed or lost data and 
programs?) 
() Yes 
()No 
15. Does your organization have a fonnal Contingency (or Disaster Recovery) Plan that can 
be used to ensure minimal interruption to nonnal business operations in the event of an 
IBM PC virus attack? 
() Yes 
()No 
lfNO: 
(a) Please explain briefly the reason: 
16. Does your organization prescribe storing back-up copies of original software (e.g., 
systems software and vendor packages) at the offsite location as soon as the package is 
open for use for your organization's: 
(a) stand-alone IBM PCs? (This is to allow restoration of a system that has been 
contaminated by a time-released virus.) 
()Yes 
( ) Yes, but not at the off'site location 
()No 
(b) networking systems? (if applicable) 
() Yes 
( ) Yes, but not at the offsite location 
()No 
17. Does your organization prescribe creating back-up copies of all applications run on your 
organization's: 
(a) stand-alone IBM PCs on a regular basis? 
() Yes 
()No 
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IfYES: 
(1) How often do you create the back-up copies? 
(b) networking systems? (if applicable) 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(1) How often do you create the back-up copies? 
18. Does your organization prescribe instituting, updating, and testing standard procedures 
for back-up and recovery for your organization's: 
(a) stand-alone IBM PCs' data and/or applications? 
() Yes 
() No 
IfYES: 
(1) 
(2) 
How often do you carry out the testing of your back-up and recovery 
procedures? 
When did you last test the back-up and recovery procedures? 
____ months ago 
(b) networking systems' data and/or applications? (if applicable) 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(1) 
(2) 
How often do you carry out the testing of your back-up and recovery 
procedures? 
When did you last test the back-up and recovery procedures? 
____ months ago 
19. Does your organization prescribe assigning personnel to specific responsibilities 
regarding back-up procedures for your organization's: 
(a) stand-alone IBM PCs? 
() Yes 
()No 
(b) networking systems? (if applicable) 
()Yes 
()No 
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20. Does your organization have any antiviral software that can be used (to ensure minimal 
interruption to normal business operations) in the event of an IBM PC virus attack? 
()Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(a) How many separate antiviral software packages do you have? 
(b) For each software packages, 
(i) What is the name of the antiviral software packages? 
21. Does your organization have a Software Acquisition Policy that can be used for 
controlling and inspecting all software brought into your organization's IBM PCs? 
() Yes 
()No 
IfYES: 
(a) Does this policy prescribe 
(i) Purchasing software only from reputable vendors? 
() Yes 
()No 
(ii) Accepting only software received in original sealed packaging? 
() Yes 
()No 
(iii) Reviewing, inspecting and testing new software as well as upgrades to 
existing software before installation? 
() Yes 
()No 
(iv) Testing any shareware, freeware, and user-developed programs in 
quarantine (e.g., test/development machine or stand-alone 
microcomputers) prior to use in production? 
() Yes 
()No 
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Sample Letter of Transmittal 
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S,_·hool n( in~-nrn1al\()!l l\:chn»k1;;J ::nd ~ ... L!tht:1;1:~tir:s 
!'hon,, 3, J ,;.; 70 
l\/1-:'.n:~/ _'_:·J \11Cur111:1tion 'l\;ch1ic!c,/JY 
S!atc: ~ ~ ,'/:.-'.r:inlcnt I1L::..1L'.i.iV:L~ ( __ 1nnHnissiun 
l'tO St. ::::t:'t);,/:~ Tc..: i'Ff~.'n~ \VA (CCU 
E [) l 'r H C O \VA {J 
I l 'l,T ' \l l' "l) .._, [ 'T' -, ·.' 
, , I ._, "-, 1 l I 
i-·u~: : -,·~·~::; l Li\ij .i\U'.) 1 H/,i.11·1 
t ,.\//LEY C/1.;/,i·U(·~ 
·i:u;::r·; cienc.:; al ,:dih C:)w;m University, Mr. 
\'Jitit ::,·,'. ,.:.1 ,:1;11 i,:I\ r ,.,'°'' .', [yf ·;,,,y ',t,L: r,·:·! (!;,::, o ~ ':1k,:tiu;1 types .1:1d cates exists. 
1·\;i~; :y :'.·; ,., J !(_',;, ··:·d .:{>'1<f>._··d!~:.: ~'/·:111 1\:t:_;~·inini;:_·-~~ :i·c. l-'i", .. s-e11t \~:·1tt;s Ui. tli,.~ C()tnputcr 
JJ,~p~:1 l.t! ·':;t ;1s :~:-1 ~1, 1 ti 
~,._ kj;~;; . ; ;:;i1 :!:i,, .. i"\''. 
:l(~: i'·->·\un \~} cc\~:i·act f()C -~:~~'. ·1ot tin ti/~. tir.-;t insL1i1c:2. \Vh~tt \\/Care 
, ·,p ·<i.--~::\1:1.tt·.<y ',~() r in: 1 1-,::·\ \!,,::~1·1 ~ln ;··.ppropriatc r· ,t"son in ycn1r 
. . . . 
111 t':l(i:1~ ;·1::t·i1;.;.; (' 
i>;ti--..~.! I ::,.ii:1-.: 1,.p11..;~:'i:.)!::; cl:r._·.,-~:-.'.,.l :.F :,)i,.: .. :_~!niHc; ~;11_c:1 ir.r 11·1n:1ti_ud as ii;f:.~<.:tini1 1·:{lc:s cf various 
:ji.· ·:; c..1· ,>.,~tnpL; _ i~ ·,,r ;·u\.~\ \\,.i!i lh-~ \I. ,::·u. :~-; J. l~a;,;i~; ((;1· ::L: inlt~i~\",iev.' ~;n li1:.1t r.ht.~ pot\~nlial fo( 
'.'.Ld;ijc,,:ii ,'.t/ ;:..r·.d i)i:.1:: 1.::.-·;'.l b,,.; .i."t-~di_tC•._':.:L rh:·~ '.}ar::i,::ir;;:·:1t\ ,·J·ili )·.l_; 2~:~iSt1_·.d Lv tli.-2 inlcrvie\ver in 
:ur~1Pi:'- :i th-.~ t.\'p12s l.JI° i11Cccti>i.~ vi1us<~') ~llould il _; u\> :l ar) 
\\/.') ?:',~ ix,rticul:irly c!esln,ns of "1bta.ining your sur'')Ci'. ,o ,(mch:ct d1is study ,it your 
urg,rni,.:itiun L .. cau:;r:: ih:rc is a dearth of d,.::taikd fact(1ai inforn1~11iu;1 :1bout the pri.:valence of 
di fft:rc11t vi ruses in W1,:,L'rn ,\u str;d ia, :rnd in Aus rr,d ia in genera I. For ex;unp le, it is 
~1.Jl!ge~:t::d th,,t 0t% of th,.: wodci's ll3tvl PC comput::r \ :n1scs :.tr.: t:rcatcd in .,\ustra!ia and New 
;. ,.:;ala,;d but thtcrc is v,.::ty liltk crnp:ric,!l r,.'sc::n,J1 to ~upprnt this cl;:iim. The present study is 
ti1u:, ~i·. r1ifiecu1t in th;1t k;•,:J\1ilcd_p,: ;il)out 1!1,: ,_.,1ci1L ;rnd 1uLurc ,,f TU\,[ PC virw;es in the 
g()vetT1(!·,,,,t si.;cwr of \\i,:::;fe:rn i\ustr;Jia ,·c,n h; cL.terrnineJ. It is interesting to note that a 
s1rniiar .•,1cly conduc!cd dL11i1c.i October lS:01 in Ll1e u:·;/\ ha; j·1ow,1 63% of the responding 
siL,:s Int l;e·n ,~xJXl.:ed U) :.1t tc~1st c: e viru-.; uvcr t!•·'. p:1st year, and 9s,; had more than 25 PCs 
inL:.:(_.~. l~ l:1 th.:; f_)rUC\~:::;s. 
11,~· .. ,_,s:::· li:na \vhik l'i:,;uirn<~ a nunmum ,1r y,,:1x tiq;;!. [,: is :,.r,Li :;pated ::lldt tlL; interview 
-,•/i:l ,:, ,: ;ii;m t ldl. ;m ;;(,11r ,11 cumplct,:. 
. 
·.• 
It is not anticipated that the intr:rview will c::iusc any discomfort or have any possible hazards 
to tl~e p;:irticipams. It should a[so be 110Lecl that, in kc,:ping with the policic:, of the university's 
Committee for ttw Conduct oC Etllic:d Research, al[ data gathered for the research will be kept 
in strictest confidence at all times. I\irticipation in the study is entirely voluntary. 
A copy of a writkn stzitemcnt tlEt describe;; ::hi~ study lo potential participant,; is attached. We 
will phone your ckp;irtmcnt t.o cunfirm your particip:ltit)n and tht: name oi a contact person 011 
April 13 or 14. Any cmestions concerning the sLudy entitled An Jnvcsti;~mion of IBM PC 
Computer Virn3,~s Infection Types and Rates in a Wt!stcrn Australian Environment can be 
directed to r.fr. Boon LEE (Principal Investigator) on T/0 6380. 
Thanking you in anticip:ition of your reply. 
Your::; sinc;;rcly 
Tony Watson 
Assoc ia((~ Pro fr:::;sor 
HEAD OF SCHOOf .. 
·---·--
INFORM/\TfON TECHNOLOGY /\ND MXlTIFMATfC.S 
Boon Guanl\...ee 
Principal Investigator 
} 
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Letter of Approval for the Conduct of Ethical Research 
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4 May 1992 
Mr Boon G Lee 
3 Pindale Gardens 
BALLAJURA WA 6066 
Dear Mr Lee 
' 
EDITH COWAN 
UNIVERSITY 
PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
MOUNT LAWLEY CAMPUS 
2 Bradford Street, Mount Lawley 
Western Australia 6050 
Telephone (09) 370 6111 
Facsimile (09) 370 2910 
I am pleased to advise you that the Honours and Higher Degree C0111Dittee 
has determined that your research proposal is in accordance with the 
standards that are required for the conduct of ethical research. 
You should now proceed with the empirical phase of the study. In doing 
so, you should be guided by the information contained in the University 
booklet "Information for Honours, Masters and Doctoral candidates on 
Research Policies and Procedures". 
Yours sincerely 
J CROSS 
Chair 
Honours and Higher Degree Conunittee 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
cc Honours file 
Supervisor, J Millar (for information) 
4 May 1992 
Mr Boon G Lee 
3 Pindale Gardens 
BALLAJURA WA 6066 
Dear Mr Lee 
I w EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA MOUNT LAWLEY CAMPUS 
2 Bradford Street. Mount Lawley 
Western Australia 6050 
Telephone (09) 370 6111 
Facsimile (09) 370 2910 
I am pleased to advise you that the Honours and Higher Degree COlllllittee 
has determined that your research proposal is in accordance with the 
standards that are required for the conduct of ethical research. 
You should now proceed with the empirical phase of the study. In doing 
so, you should be guided by the information contained in the University 
booklet "Information for Honours, Masters and Doctoral candidates on 
Research Policies and Procedures". 
Yours sincer~_l.L---, 
J CROSS 
Chair 
Honours and Higher Degree Coomittee 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
cc Honours file 
Supervisor, J Millar (for information) 
Honours Thesis LEE Boon Guan Semester 1, 1992 
Appendix 5 
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Edith Cowan University 
School of Information Technology and Mathematics 
Form of Disclosure and Informed Consent 
This is a written statement that describes the project to potential participants so that they may 
choose whether or not to participate after reading it. A copy of the statement is made available to 
participants for their records. 
1. The present study is conducted by the interviewer in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of Bachelor of Applied Science (Information Science) 
Honours at Edith Cowan University. The main purpose of the study is to investigate the 
infection types and rates of IBM PC viruses in limited Government I. T. organizations in 
Western Australia. The data gathering instrument for this study will be a standardized 
questionnaire which will comprise limited choice questions directed at obtaining such 
information as infection rates and types of various computer viruses. The questionnaire 
will be used by the interviewer as a basis for the interview so that the potential for 
subjectivity and bias can be reduced. The participants will be assisted by the interviewer 
in identifying the types of infecting viruses should the need arise. 
2. It is not anticipated that the present study will cause any discomfort or have any possible 
hazards to the participants. 
3. It is anticipated that the interview will take about half an hour to be completed. 
4. The present study is significant in that knowledge about the extent and nature of IBM 
PC viruses in the government sector of Western Australia can be determined. The 
information will be provided to participants in summary form. No organization will be 
directly identifiable from the reports developed during the study. 
5. A participant's further care will not be prejudiced in any way by his or her refusal to 
participate. 
6. Any questions concerning the study entitled An Investigation of IBM PC Computer 
Viruses Infection Rates and Types in a Western Australian Environment can be directed 
to Mr. Boon LEE (Principal Investigator) of the Department of Computer Science on 
370 6470. 
I (the participant) have read the information above and any questions I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I agreed to participate in this activity, realising I may withdraw at 
anytime. 
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided my organization 
and I are not identifiable. 
Participant or authorised representative Date 
Investigator Date 
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State Government IT Organizations 
Agriculture Protection Board 
Authority For Intellectually Handicapped Persons 
Central Metropolitan College of T AFE 
Department of Land Administration 
Department of Mines 
Department of Planning and Urban Development 
Department of Productivity and Labour Relations 
Department of State Development 
Department of State Services 
Department of Transport 
Environmental Protection Authority 
Fremantle Port Authority 
Government Employees Superannuation Board 
Health Department of WA 
Homewest 
Industrial Relations Commission 
Legal Aid Commission 
Lotteries Commission 
Main Roads Department 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Premier and Cabinet 
Ministry of Sport and Recreation 
Museum of Western Australia 
Occupational Health Safety & Welfare 
Office of Racing and Gaming 
Office of the Auditor General 
Perth Theatre Trust 
Public Service Commission 
Secondary Education Authority 
South Metropolitan College of T AFE 
South West Development Authority 
State Energy Commission (WA) 
State Government Insurance Commission 
State Library Services of WA 
State Taxation Department 
Stateships 
Transperth 
Treasury Department 
Valuer General's Office 
WA Electoral Commission 
WA Fire Brigades Board 
WA Police Department 
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* 
WA Regional Computing Centre 
WA Tourism Commision 
Water Authority of WA 
Westrail 
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Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission 
* indicates not participating organizations 
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